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  INTRODUCTION   
Courts and scholars have long debated the proper balance 
between antitrust law and intellectual property rights. Propo-
nents of strong intellectual property rights and those of vigilant 
antitrust enforcement often find themselves at opposite ends of 
the debate. Some scholars and intellectual property owners re-
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sist the encroachment of antitrust law into the intellectual 
property arena. Antitrust advocates view with suspicion the po-
tential exercise of market power by intellectual property own-
ers in a manner that expands the legitimate power of a patent 
in an illegitimate way. While the vast majority of patents do 
not confer monopoly power, antitrust principles are implicated 
in those markets where monopolists do in fact maintain their 
dominant position through patents. 
Amidst the discord, relative consensus prevails in one area. 
Even supporters of strong patent protection have generally not 
quarreled with antitrust law’s treatment of patents procured 
through fraud. The Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act)1 pro-
scribes the use of invalid patents to secure a monopoly, and the 
patent system has little interest in protecting the ability of 
firms to acquire and enforce invalid patents.2 
But antitrust law’s current treatment of invalid patents 
remains inadequate. While antitrust law recognizes that en-
forcing invalid patents can constitute illegal monopolization or 
attempted monopolization, courts have refused to consider the 
anticompetitive effects of simply having an invalid patent. This 
Article argues that, under certain circumstances, a monopo-
list’s possession of a patent that it knows to be invalid, which it 
holds out to the world as valid, should violate the Sherman 
Act’s prohibition on monopolization. 
Part One lays out the current state of the law regarding 
when the use of an invalid patent violates the Sherman Act. 
Invalid patents can give rise to antitrust liability when a mo-
nopolist commits fraud against the Patent Office or brings an 
infringement lawsuit based on a fraudulently procured patent. 
These are, respectively, the Walker Process and the Handgards 
theories of recovery. Under either cause of action, the antitrust 
plaintiff must show that the defendant actually enforced its in-
valid patent. 
Part Two argues that this current doctrine, by limiting li-
ability to instances of actual enforcement of an invalid patent, 
is too constricted. Mere possession of an invalid patent can help 
maintain an illegitimate monopoly even if the monopolist pat-
ent-holder takes no affirmative steps to enforce its patent. The 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000) (amended 2004). 
 2. This Article focuses on those invalid patents either that are procured 
by the applicant’s fraud on the Patent and Trademark Office, or that the pat-
ent owner later discovers should not have been issued because the patent (or 
one of its claims) failed one of the patentability requirements. 
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fear of infringement litigation can deter entry into the monopo-
list’s market, even if the potential competitor strongly believes 
that the patent at issue is invalid. Invalid patents can also in-
crease entry costs by compelling rivals to research the patent’s 
validity, to attempt to design around the patent, or to pay (un-
necessary) licensing fees. Even a monopolist’s suspect patents 
can deter its competitors’ customers, business partners, and 
venture capitalists from doing business with them. In some 
cases, firms may avoid entire fields of research out of fear of in-
fringement litigation, a phenomenon that can distort innova-
tion and reduce long term competition even further. Part Two 
concludes by showing that all of these anticompetitive conse-
quences occur even if competitors are aware of the critical pat-
ent’s suspect validity. 
Part Three demonstrates that currently neither patent law 
nor antitrust law can adequately cleanse the marketplace of 
those invalid patents that injure competition and reduce social 
welfare. Within patent law, none of the mechanisms designed 
to eliminate invalid patents—public use proceedings, reexami-
nations, and declaratory judgment actions—functions as in-
tended. Unrealistic standing thresholds, insufficient penalties, 
and collective action problems prevent each mechanism from 
being a truly effective method to detect and deter patent fraud. 
Current antitrust law also fails to solve the problem of anti-
competitive invalid patents. Antitrust liability is contingent on 
the patentee actually enforcing its invalid patent, but enforce-
ment is narrowly defined. This condition allows some monopo-
lists to exercise the exclusionary power of an invalid patent 
without inviting antitrust litigation. 
Part Four explains why and when a monopolist’s knowing 
maintenance of an invalid patent should constitute exclusion-
ary conduct sufficient to violate Section Two of the Sherman 
Act. Antitrust law does not condemn firms for having monopoly 
power—the power to raise prices and exclude competitors. It 
only proscribes the maintenance or acquisition of monopoly 
power through anticompetitive conduct, as opposed to through 
business acumen or the development of a superior product. If a 
monopolist secures its market power by keeping competitors at 
bay through the maintenance of an invalid patent, it engages in 
quintessential exclusionary conduct without any redeeming 
value. Part Four argues that if the defendant has monopoly 
power in a relevant market, then a prima facie Section Two 
case is established if an antitrust plaintiff can show three ele-
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ments: (1) the monopolist’s patent is invalid, (2) the monopolist 
knew that its patent was invalid, and (3) the monopolist did not 
sufficiently disavow its invalid patent. Taken together, these 
three elements satisfy the conduct requirement for illegal mo-
nopolization. Of course, any private plaintiff would also have to 
establish that it suffered causal antitrust injury in order to suc-
ceed in its suit. Liability is contingent on the excluded competi-
tor proving that it was aware of the monopolist’s patent and 
that but for the fear of infringement the competitor would have 
entered the market. Finally, Part Four explains the increased 
efficiency of addressing the problem of invalid patents through 
antitrust jurisprudence rather than relying exclusively on pat-
ent law. 
Part Five addresses arguments against treating the know-
ing possession of invalid patents by a monopolist as the basis 
for Section Two liability. After rebutting the objection that an 
expanded cause of action is unnecessary, Part Five argues that 
expanded antitrust liability will not lead to false positives or 
nuisance suits. While recognizing that any new cause of action 
creates the risk of mistakes and abuse, Part Five notes that a 
number of factors should serve to filter out false positives and 
nuisance suits, including heightened pleading and evidentiary 
standards. In sum, treating possession of invalid patents as ex-
clusionary conduct would not unreasonably interfere with the 
patent system or the innovation it is intended to encourage. 
Ultimately, this Article does not argue that greater anti-
trust liability will eliminate all invalid patents. But, expanding 
the contours of the current Walker Process doctrine will expose 
at least some invalid patents and reduce the incentives to ac-
quire or maintain others. It will also focus attention on those 
invalid patents that are most likely to injure competition, with-
out deterring the acquisition of legitimate patents or allowing 
the harassment of innocent patentees. However, expanded an-
titrust liability does provide a meaningful opportunity to deter 
both fraud upon the Patent Office and the maintenance of pow-
erful patents that are later discovered by the patentee to be in-
valid. 
I.  ANTITRUST LAW AND INVALID PATENTS   
Thousands of patents issue every year in the United 
States. Unfortunately, many of these patents are, in fact, inva-
lid. In a recent study on the number of invalidated patents, 
Professors Allison and Lemley found that forty-six percent of 
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litigated patents were held invalid.3 Though much lower than 
those numbers found by other studies of earlier time periods,4 
the number of invalid patents found by Professors Allison and 
Lemley is nonetheless high. 
Upon reflection, it is hardly surprising that so many inva-
lid patents issue. Even the most rational, cost-effective patent 
system would issue some invalid patents, but flaws in the 
American system unnecessarily increase that number.5 After 
an inventor files a patent application, the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) assigns an examiner who reviews the appli-
cation and decides whether to grant the patent.6 The examiner 
is constrained by many factors that decrease her ability to weed 
out applications that should not result in patents. One such 
constraint is time. In recent Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
hearings on competition and patent law, witnesses “estimated 
that patent examiners have from 8 to 25 hours to read and un-
derstand each application, search for prior art, evaluate pat-
entability, communicate with the applicant, work out necessary 
revisions, and reach and write up conclusions.”7 This is often an 
 
 3. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity 
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); see also Mark A. Lemley, 
An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 420 
(1994). 
 4. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d. 
867, 872 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[T]he bald fact is that more than 80% of patent in-
fringement actions on appeal result in a determination that the patent sued 
upon is invalid.” (citing Roger M. Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales 
and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17, 31 & n.62 (1971))); GLORIA K. 
KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 4-
41, n.35.2 (rev. ed. 1980) (using data from 1953–77 and noting that patents 
were held valid only 35% of the time); P.J. Federico, Adjudicated Patents, 
1948–54, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233, 236 (1956) (using data from 1948–54 and 
noting that patents were held valid in only 30–40% of the cases where validity 
was an issue). 
 5. For a provocative argument in defense of the current system see Mark 
A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 
(2001). 
 6. James C. De Vellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the 
Rights of Patent Holders with the Need for Industry-Wide Standards, 31 
AIPLA Q.J. 301, 313 (2003). 
 7. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BAL-
ANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, Executive Summary, at 
10 (2003) [hereinafter FTC INNOVATION REPORT]; see Lemley, supra note 5, at 
1500 n.19 (noting an estimate of an average of eighteen hours per application); 
John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Pro-
posal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (2001) (“[T]he average 
time allocated for an examiner to address one application is understood to be 
between sixteen and seventeen hours.”). 
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insufficient amount of time to discover relevant prior art or 
other facts that would lead the examiner to reject the applica-
tion, and this problem is exacerbated as the number and com-
plexity of patent applications increases.8 
Exacerbating the time pressure are information con-
straints. In some cases, examiners are not adequately trained 
in the necessary technical field of a particular patent applica-
tion.9 Examiners are also unable to conduct comprehensive 
searches of the prior art for every patent application,10 so, they 
often must rely on the representations made in the patent ap-
plication, which are presumed to be true.11 Of course, the exam-
iner is almost completely dependent on the applicant’s asser-
tions of such important dates as the date of first invention or 
the date of first sale.12 Although the patent rules require the 
applicant to disclose whatever prior art might be material to 
the patent application, the applicant is not required to conduct 
 
 8. C.f. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, at 
9–10 (“The PTO’s resources also appear inadequate to allow efficient and accu-
rate screening of questionable patent applications. Patent applications have 
doubled in the last twelve years and are increasing at about 10% per year. 
With yearly applications approximating 300,000, they arrive at the rate of 
about 1,000 each working day.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 5, at 1495 n.2. (“This criticism has a 
great deal of force with respect to software patents, where the PTO clearly 
missed the ball for over a decade, failing to hire examiners skilled in the soft-
ware arts or to allow software engineers to practice before it, and failing to 
classify software prior art well.”). 
 10. Although examiners routinely search patent databases, in some fields 
the relevant prior art is not patented. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts 
and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589 (1999) (noting 
that for software and business methods “patents have only recently become 
available” and that “[t]here is every reason to believe that there is a vast vol-
ume of non-patent prior art” in these fields). 
 11. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“[The PTO] 
must rely on applicants for many of the facts upon which its decisions are 
based.”). 
 12. See Tiegel Mfg. Co. v. Farmer Mold & Mach. Works, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 
1051, 1061 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (“The PTO is particularly dependent upon a pat-
ent applicant for prior art information that is uniquely within the knowledge 
of the applicant.”); Thomas, supra note 7, at 314 (“Absent the ability to compel 
the disclosure of pertinent facts, examiners are virtually unable to locate un-
documented or secret prior art. Examiners must also take applicants at their 
word when they attest to such significant facts as dates of inventive activity, 
indicia of nonobviousness or the derivation of a prior art reference.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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searches for relevant prior art.13 Indeed, given the strict penal-
ties for failure to disclose known prior art that the PTO or fed-
eral judges might later conclude was material, patent appli-
cants have a strong disincentive to research the prior art 
themselves.14 Competing firms that would be negatively af-
fected by the PTO granting the patent have a meaningful in-
centive to discover prior art, but the patent application proce-
dure is ex parte, so adverse parties are generally unable to 
present relevant prior art or to advance other arguments 
against patent issuance.15 
Evidentiary standards provide an additional obstacle to 
PTO examiners denying patent applications. The examiner es-
sentially has the burden of proving nonpatentability rather 
than the applicant being compelled to establish patentability.16 
The FTC concluded in its report that “[t]he allocation of bur-
den, coupled with examiners’ limited ability to probe appli-
cants’ assertions, may explain the significant presumptions 
that favor applicants during patent examinations. Many of the 
key issues are rebuttably presumed in the applicant’s favor.”17 
Yet the presumption is extremely difficult to rebut because “the 
PTO lacks testing facilities, and assertions that cannot be over-
come by documentary evidence promptly identifiable by the ex-
aminer often must be accepted.”18 Although theoretically the 
“issuance of a patent stands for the proposition that the PTO 
 
 13. See FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“As a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a prior art search, 
and thus there is no duty to disclose art of which an applicant could have been 
aware.”); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 609, at 600–18 (8th ed. 2001) (“There is no requirement that an 
applicant for a patent make a patentability search.”); Thomas, supra note 7, at 
314–15. 
 14. C.f. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[2][b][i], at 19-
177 (2005) (“[A]n applicant and his or her patent attorney [are] under no duty 
to conduct a search of the prior art.”); see also Thomas, supra note 7, at 314–15 
(noting that because applicants have no duty to search for prior art, “[c]oupled 
with the draconian consequences of a holding of inequitable conduct, many 
applicants are discouraged from conducting prior art searches in the first 
place” (footnote omitted)). 
 15. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and 
the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 755 (1986) (“[T]he absence of an 
interested party adverse to the patentee makes it improbable that every ar-
gument against patentability will be considered in every case.”). 
 16. C.f. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (providing that “[a] person shall be entitled 
to a patent unless” prior art invalidates the patent (emphasis added)). 
 17. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 9. 
 18. Id. 
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has reviewed the information contained in a patent and de-
clared that it describes something new, useful, and nonobvi-
ous,” the constraints of time, information, and evidentiary stan-
dards create a situation where “[t]he PTO’s evaluation of a 
patent may be so poor or hurried as to be near meaningless.”19 
The result is the issuance of invalid patents.20 
Invalid patents are most often exposed through litigation; 
patent invalidity is a commonly asserted response to charges of 
patent infringement. The defendant in such a suit generally 
makes two distinct arguments regarding the invalidity of the 
plaintiff ’s patent.21 First, it may argue that that the patent is 
invalid as a traditional defense (i.e., “I did not unlawfully in-
fringe the patent because the patent is invalid.”). Second, the 
patent infringement defendant may assert an antitrust coun-
terclaim based on the patentee’s enforcement of a fraudulently 
procured (or known invalid) patent.22 Antitrust law allows for 
 
 19. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 667–68 (2002); 
see also John A. Jeffery, Preserving the Presumption of Patent Validity: An Al-
ternative to Outsourcing the U.S. Patent Examiner’s Prior Art Search, 52 
CATH. U. L. REV. 761, 772 (2003) (“Critics cite high examiner turnover, lack of 
experience in certain areas (e.g., business methods), and ignorance of relevant 
prior art due to time pressure. Critics have also alleged that examiners give 
only cursory consideration to non-patent literature in areas where such litera-
ture is more important to the prior art search than patents.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
 20. Technically, it would be more accurate to talk about invalid claims 
rather than invalid patents. CHISUM, supra note 14, § 19.02, at 19-13. Most 
patents have multiple claims. It is possible that some claims are valid while 
others are not. Nevertheless, this Article will use the terminology of invalid 
patents for three reasons. First, that is the convention of the scholarship in 
this area. Second, for better or worse, juries generally make validity determi-
nations at the patent level, not the claim level. Third, courts themselves rarely 
disaggregate claims, doing so only in 2.3% of litigated cases. Allison & Lemley, 
supra note 3, at 228. 
 21. It is possible for a patent to be unenforceable due to inequitable con-
duct, even though the patent may still be valid in the sense that it meets the 
requirements of patentability. See CHISUM, supra note 14, § 19.03. This Article 
does not address such patents, but rather focuses only on those patents that 
should not have issued because the claims are invalid. 
 22. See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 
1067 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]n antitrust claim premised on stripping a patentee 
of its immunity from the antitrust laws is typically raised as a counterclaim by 
a defendant in a patent infringement suit.”); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Ordinarily, anti-
trust claims premised on the enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent 
are brought by an accused infringer as a counterclaim to the original charge of 
infringement.” (citing Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1067)). 
Competitors may also challenge patent validity through a declaratory 
judgment action. See infra notes 199–235 and accompanying text. 
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two separate causes of action which the alleged infringer may 
bring based on a monopolist’s use of an invalid patent.23 Be-
cause Section Two of the Sherman Act condemns both actual 
monopolization and attempted monopolization, an antitrust 
claim can be premised on the patentee’s use of an invalid pat-
ent either to monopolize a relevant market or to attempt to 
monopolize such a market. 
The Supreme Court first recognized that invalid patents 
procured through fraud can give rise to Section Two liability in 
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical 
Corp.24 Walker Process and Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. 
(FMC) competed in the manufacture and sale of sewage treat-
ment equipment.25 On September 7, 1943, FMC received a pat-
ent for certain aeration equipment—“swing diffusers”—used in 
sewage treatment systems.26 Thereafter, FMC faced virtually 
no competition in that market until Walker Process began em-
ploying similar equipment that apparently infringed the pat-
ent.27 In June 1960, FMC brought an infringement action 
against Walker Process.28 During its discovery efforts, Walker 
Process found proof that its earlier suspicions were correct: 
FMC had made public use of its patented product more than a 
year before filing its patent application and, therefore, FMC’s 
patent was invalid.29 Walker Process defended against the in-
fringement charge by arguing that the patent was invalid and 
also counterclaimed, asserting that FMC had illegally monopo-
lized the market.30 It further alleged that FMC had procured 
its patent by committing fraud against the PTO, namely by 
concealing prior art, which if known to the PTO would have led 
it to refuse to issue the patent.31 The Court “concluded that the 
 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (amended 2004) (making it an offense to “monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize”). 
 24. 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965). 
 25. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & 
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1964) (No. 602), reprinted in 17 ANTITRUST LAW: 
MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1955 TERM–1975 TERM 655, 661 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1979) [hereinafter ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS]. 
 26. Id. at 4, ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 
662. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174.  
 31. Id. 
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enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office 
may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other 
elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.”32 
Years later, the Ninth Circuit built upon Walker Process in 
Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc.33 In Handgards, the antitrust 
defendant’s conduct did not fall within the four corners of 
Walker Process because the defendant did not itself commit any 
fraud against the PTO in order to obtain its patent.34 Hand-
gards recognized that regardless of how a monopolist acquires 
an invalid patent, if it knows of that patent’s invalidity and still 
enforces the patent to eliminate competitors, a Section Two vio-
lation may lie.35 Walker Process and Handgards form a cohe-
sive antitrust doctrine that condemns a monopolist’s enforce-
ment of an invalid patent either to acquire or to maintain a 
monopoly.36 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 34. Id. at 994. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the case was “not a Walker 
Process case.” Rather: 
Walker Process stands for the proposition that “the enforcement of a 
patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office” may give rise to anti-
trust liability. Plaintiff Handgards does not contend that Ethicon 
sought to enforce a fraudulently-procured patent. Instead, Handgards 
asserts that Ethicon prosecuted infringement actions in bad faith, 
that is, with knowledge that the patents, though lawfully-obtained, 
were invalid. 
Id. (quoting Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174). 
Handgards operationalizes dicta that appear in Walker Process. See 
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177 n.5 (“This conclusion [that fraudulent pro-
curement of a patent may ground an antitrust violation] applies with equal 
force to an assignee who maintains and enforces the patent with knowledge of 
the patent’s infirmity.”). 
 35. Handgards, 601 F.2d at 996. However, under either a Walker Process 
or Handgards claim, antitrust law does not automatically condemn any en-
forcement of invalid patents. See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174. The plaintiff 
must still satisfy both prongs of the Grinnell monopolization test, United 
States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966), or all three prongs of the Spec-
trum Sports test for attempted monopolization, Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). Under both tests, the plaintiff will have 
to correctly define the relevant product and geographic markets and to prove 
that the defendant has monopoly power—or that there is a dangerous prob-
ability of the defendant acquiring such power in the case of attempted mo-
nopolization—in that relevant market. See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456; 
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71. 
 36. Handgards also creates a cause of action when the patentee holds a 
valid patent but brings an infringement suit against a competitor that the 
patentee knows is not infringing. See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Gen-
pharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 380 (D.N.J. 1999). 
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Under both Walker Process and Handgards, current law 
requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant took steps to 
enforce its invalid patent.37 Enforcement efforts sufficient to 
trigger a Walker Process or Handgards claim can take a couple 
of forms. While suing for infringement clearly constitutes en-
forcement, so do threatening to sue and sending cease and de-
sist letters.38 However, in the four decades since Walker Proc-
ess, courts have routinely rejected Section Two claims based on 
an alleged monopolist’s possession of invalid patents when the 
plaintiff could not prove that the defendant affirmatively en-
forced the patent in question.39 Soon after Walker Process, 
courts elevated enforcement to “the sine qua non of a Sherman 
Act violation [based on] fraud in the procurement of a patent.”40 
Merely obtaining an invalid market-dominating patent—even 
when that patent was obtained by a monopolist—can not trig-
ger antitrust liability in the absence of enforcement of the pat-
ent.41 An early commentator on Walker Process opined: 
Inherent in the patent grant is the statutory monopoly right to ex-
clude others from making, using, or selling the invention. Yet, it is not 
the mere existence of the patent—however fraudulently it has been 
obtained—which brings antitrust liability to its owner; it is the 
owner’s assertion or enforcement of the patent which brings on anti-
trust liability. . . . A patent may dominate a significant part of trade 
or commerce by its claims, yet if its owner did not enforce it and gave 
royalty-free nonexclusive licenses to all who wished them, it is doubt-
ful if the owner would be subject to antitrust liability.42 
 
 37. See, e.g., K-Lath, Inc. v. Davis Wire Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964 
(C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 38. See, e.g., Agron, Inc. v. Lin, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1714, 1720 (C.D. Cal. 2004); 
OpenLCR.com, Inc. v. Rates Tech., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228–33 (D. 
Colo. 2000); Arcade, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991 
WL 185155, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 1991), aff ’d, 1 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 39. See, e.g., K-Lath, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (“The Federal Circuit and Su-
preme Court clearly require the enforcement or assertion of the patent as an 
element necessary to establish antitrust liability.”). 
 40. Struthers Scientific & Int’l Corp. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 
1329, 1331 (D. Del. 1971) (“The Supreme Court’s [Walker Process] opinion 
made it clear, however, that the sine qua non of a Section 2 Sherman Act vio-
lation depends upon the prerequisites of a fraudulent procurement and en-
forcement of a patent.”). 
 41. See id. at 1332 (“It is not the mere obtaining of a fraudulent patent 
which brings antitrust liability to its owner; it is the assertion or enforcement 
of the issued patent acquired by fraud which creates antitrust liability.”). 
 42. Neil A. Smith, Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Law (pt. 2), 53 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 423, 434–
35 (1971). 
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Later courts also imposed the requirement, holding that 
“[w]ithout some effort at enforcement, the patent cannot serve 
as the foundation of a monopolization case.”43 Indeed, without 
active enforcement, an antitrust court will not even reach the 
question of the patent’s validity.44 
Although the Supreme Court has never articulated a ra-
tionale for the enforcement requirement, the unspoken as-
sumption is that absent enforcement, an invalid patent cannot 
adversely affect competition.45 The Federal Circuit has stated 
this view most forcefully, asserting that “[m]ere procurement of 
a patent, whatever the conduct of the applicant in the procure-
ment, cannot without more affect the welfare of the consumer 
and cannot in itself violate the antitrust laws.”46 This Article 
seeks to challenge the Federal Circuit’s assertion—and the 
widespread assumption that it articulates—as mistaken. Part 
Two will argue that the mere procurement and possession of an 
invalid patent can, in fact, injure competition and reduce con-
sumer welfare. 
II.  MERE POSSESSION OF INVALID PATENTS  
CAN INJURE COMPETITION   
Federal courts have founded current doctrine on the as-
sumption that invalid patents only injure competition when the 
patent-holder attempts to enforce its patent rights.47 Federal 
courts have never seriously considered whether mere owner-
ship of invalid patents can distort competition; rather they 
have simply assumed that it cannot.48 This section considers 
the exclusionary effects of patents and argues that some invalid 
patents can deter market entry and decrease consumer welfare 
even without active enforcement. 
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF INVALID PATENTS 
The mere presence of a patent distorts markets even if the 
patent-holder takes no affirmative steps to enforce the patent. 
 
 43. Cal. E. Lab., Inc. v. Gould, 896 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 44. See Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1162 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innova-
tions, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 45. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 n.16 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text. 
 48. See, e.g., FMC, 835 F.2d at 1418 n.16. 
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After noting that the primary purpose of patents is to exclude 
competitors, this section explains how even invalid patents can 
create unacceptable litigation risks for potential entrants, raise 
entry costs, delay entry, deter customers and business partners 
from contracting with new entrants, and impose inefficiencies 
while distorting innovation. 
1. Fear of Litigation 
Given the inherent exclusionary potential of patent rights, 
patent law attempts to strike a balance between apparently 
competing goals by rewarding innovation without unduly ham-
pering competition.49 In exchange for the inventor’s disclosure 
of her discovery to the public, the government grants a bundle 
of rights to the patent-holder.50 While this grant may result in 
monopoly—an outcome generally condemned by the govern-
ment—a patent does not confer upon the patent-holder the 
right to actually practice the patent.51 Instead, the patent 
grants the inventor “the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United 
States” while the patent is in force.52 
It is hardly controversial that patents represent a barrier 
to entry in many markets. When the PTO issues a patent, it 
provides public notice to would-be competitors that another 
market participant has already acquired the bundle of exclu-
sionary rights.53 Courts have consistently recognized that these 
exclusionary rights distort and potentially destroy the competi-
tive marketplace.54 Federal judges have opined that “[i]t goes 
without saying that patents have adverse effects on competi-
 
 49. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6 (1998). 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id. at 6. For example, in the case of an improvement patent, the pat-
ent cannot be exercised without infringing another patent, assuming that the 
underlying patent and improvement patent are owned by different parties. See 
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 997–98 (3d ed. 2002). 
 52. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2000). 
 53. See, , Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1379 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing the “public notice function of patents”). 
 54. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 
1066–67 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he exclusionary power of a patent [seems] incon-
gruous with the goals of antitrust law.”). 
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tion”55 and that “[b]y their nature, patents create an environ-
ment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple competition.”56 
In most instances, the patent barrier to entry is perfectly 
legal.57 Patent-holders can sue infringing competitors in order 
to exclude them from the market and can pursue actions short 
of actually filing litigation to enforce their patent rights.58 For 
example, “where a patent is valid, the patentee has the right to 
give notice to infringers and their customers of the patent and 
to threaten litigation for infringement without violating the an-
titrust laws.”59 Indeed, the ownership of a valid patent often 
constitutes a defense to monopolization claims, so long as the 
patent is valid and the patentee has not exceeded its scope.60 
Unfortunately, the exclusionary effects of a patent do not 
completely depend on that patent’s validity. Invalid patents can 
have the same anticompetitive effects as valid patents. This 
presents a problem because while our patent system attempts 
to strike a balance between encouraging innovation and sup-
pressing competition, that balance is thrown off when an inva-
lid patent issues. The invalid patent suppresses competition 
without enhancing innovation.61 
The monopolist’s possession of a patent—even an invalid 
one—serves as a head on a pike. Until a court invalidates it, or 
until the owner explicitly disavows it and dedicates it to the 
public domain, every patent can give pause to potential com-
 
 55. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 523–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 56. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065–66; see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (“[T]he essence of a patent grant is 
the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention.”); Valley 
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of the patent grant.”); Giles 
S. Rich, Foreword to DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, 
supra note 49, at iii, iii (1998) (“The power of the federal courts is made avail-
able to patentees for the enforcement of this right to exclude others. Who are 
these ‘others’? Competitors, of course.”). 
 57. Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F. Supp 1044, 1048 (D. Colo. 1997). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. (citing Brown v. Myerberg, 314 F. Supp. 939, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 60. See id. (“Therefore, ownership of a valid patent precludes antitrust 
liability for monopolization of a product or process within the scope of the pat-
ent.” (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964))). 
 61. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power 
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty 
and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1019 (1999) (“Enforcing 
invalid patents creates ex post pricing distortions without enhancing innova-
tion.”). 
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petitors who know about it.62 In his oft-quoted insight, Judge 
Learned Hand famously analogized a suspect patent to a scare-
crow with the ability to deter competitors even without in-
fringement litigation.63 More recently, the Supreme Court, in 
discussing the Declaratory Judgment Act,64 recognized the risk 
of the “‘patent owner [who] engages in a danse macabre, bran-
dishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword. . . . 
[C]ompetitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless 
and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the 
nettle and sue.’”65 The Federal Circuit, too, has noted the 
“[g]uerrilla-like” attacks of “the patent owner [who] attempts 
extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-
run tactics . . . infect the competitive environment of the busi-
ness community with uncertainty and insecurity.”66 While de-
claratory judgment actions are supposed to prevent such hit-
and-run antics which fall short of actual litigation, they cur-
rently cannot.67 
Some may argue that invalid patents should not deter com-
petitors because invalidity would be a complete defense to any 
infringement suit brought by the patent-holder.68 This position 
underestimates the role of rational fear in market entry deci-
sions.69 Patents deter market entry because competitors who 
sell infringing products could be liable for significant damages 
including, in the case of willful infringement, treble damages 
and attorneys’ fees.70 These severe consequences deter market 
entry.71 Some firms may not risk infringing activity even if they 
 
 62. See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text. 
 63. Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). 
 65. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95–96 (1993) 
(quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734–
35 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 66. Arrowhead Indus., 846 F.2d at 735. 
 67. See infra notes 199–235 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th 
Cir. 1984) (“[A] patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage 
competitors from making the patented product or using the patented proc-
ess.”). 
 69. See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003). 
 70. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found.”); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“The court in exceptional 
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 71. See Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 755 (“The existence of the patent—and 
the fear of an infringement action—may deter some potential rivals from com-
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believe the dominant firm’s patent is invalid because the costs 
of being wrong are too high.72 The probability of foregone entry 
increases with a firm’s level of risk aversion and its lack of 
knowledge of substantive patent law.73 In some cases, the fear 
of litigation could encourage particularly risk averse firms to 
“avoid market or research activities out of recognition of the 
vagaries of litigation results and the possibility of infringement 
liability.”74 More importantly, win or lose, the alleged infringer 
may end up paying millions in litigation costs. The direct litiga-
tion costs for patent litigation in which between $1 million and 
$25 million is at stake averaged $2 million per side in 2003.75 
When the stakes rise above $25 million, the average cost dou-
bles to $4 million per side.76 These figures do not include indi-
rect costs, such as reduced productivity.77 
Cost-benefit analysis shows how an invalid patent can de-
ter a competitor’s entry. The potential costs of entry, as just de-
scribed, are staggering. In contrast, the potential benefits are 
diminished by the fact that the entrant will not earn monopoly 
profits since it will be competing against the current monopo-
list. Not only are the potential costs of patent-infringing market 
entry high, the patentee can reduce the potential entrant’s per-
ceived benefits of infringing and entering the market by engag-
ing in limit pricing.78 In reality, it is difficult for the potential 
entrant to perform a proper cost-benefit analysis because it is 
exceedingly difficult to estimate the probability of prevailing on 
an invalidity defense in a patent infringement suit. Yet, every 
such firm faces a serious gamble in deciding whether to enter a 
market and risk patent litigation, including possibly bankrupt-
ing damages. As a result, “patents have in terrorem effects: no 
 
peting with the patentee and his licensees.”). 
 72. See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text. 
 73. Gregory Gelfand, Expanding the Role of the Patent Office in Determin-
ing Patent Validity: A Proposal, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 75, 97 (1979) (“A specious 
patent will continue to be useful for bluffing and threatening those who do not 
have the benefit of a patent counsel’s advice or the resources to face even a 
sham lawsuit.”). 
 74. Thomas, supra note 7, at 319. 
 75. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 
22 (2003) [hereinafter AIPLA ECONOMIC SURVEY]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 21. 
 78. See Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 700 (“If the first producer’s pricing 
strategy is to take only a small profit on the innovation, competitors may de-
cide it is not worth their while to imitate, leaving the field—even for a nonpat-
ented invention—to the innovator and his licensees.”). 
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one wants to invest in a business that cannot succeed without 
first winning a lawsuit.”79 
Furthermore, the in terrorem effect may extend beyond the 
firm’s balance sheet to the individual decision makers within 
the firm who are concerned about their own personal liability. 
Individual officers and directors can be held liable for inducing 
their firms to infringe a patent.80 While the likelihood of indi-
vidual liability may seem small, the prospect of personal bank-
ruptcy provides a powerful incentive to avoid the risk of in-
fringement. 
The current enforcement requirement in Walker Process-
type claims fails to appreciate how this fear of patent litigation 
can deter market entry. For example, the Federal Circuit has 
completely discounted a competitor’s contention 
that a reasonable apprehension of suit arises when a patentee does 
nothing more than exercise its lawful commercial prerogatives and, in 
so doing, puts a competitor in the position of having to choose be-
tween abandoning a particular business venture or bringing matters 
to a head by engaging in arguably infringing activity.81 
Yet it would be completely unreasonable for a competitor not to 
feel apprehensive about being sued if it knew that it was in-
fringing the patent of a dominant firm, even if it believed that 
patent to be invalid.82 Never having entered a market or in-
fringed a patent themselves, most federal judges are simply ill-
equipped to understand the decision-making processes of busi-
ness executives put in such a dilemma by a suspect patent. The 
Walker Process case itself shows how invalid patents can dis-
tort competition and allow the patent-holder to act like a mo-
nopolist. In its amicus brief in support of the petitioner, Walker 
 
 79. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Busi-
ness?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 270 (2000). 
 80. See Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 225, 229 (2005) (citing Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 
1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., 
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom 
Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Manville Sales Corp. v. 
Paramount Sys. Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 552–53 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 81. Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innova-
tions, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
Nonetheless, the district court in Cygnus—in a decision affirmed by the 
Federal Circuit—dismissed the declarations of doctors familiar with the 
pharmaceutical industry that reasonable competitors would interpret the pat-
ent-holder’s actions as manifesting an intent to sue, because it considered 
them to be more lay opinions than expert declarations. Id. at 1161 n.1. 
 82. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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Process, the government noted that: 
[I]n the present case the record indicates that the patent apparently 
gave FMC broad market control. An FMC employee stated on deposi-
tion that it was “probably correct” that “throughout the life of the pat-
ent” FMC had “virtually no competition in the sale of swing diffusers[, 
the product over which FMC had an invalid patent].”83 
FMC’s invalid patent gave it the ability to act like a mo-
nopolist. Before its invalid patent expired, FMC charged $150 
per lineal foot of equipment; when the patent expired, the mar-
ket price fell by two-thirds to $50.84 The facts underlying 
Walker Process demonstrate what patent scholars have long 
recognized: “[P]atents, even invalid patents, exert an influence 
on the market.”85 There are presumably more instances of inva-
lid patents creating monopoly power even though the patents 
are not actively enforced. However, firms rarely announce their 
decision to decline market entry as a result of others’ patents, 
valid or invalid. 
In sum, so long as a would-be competitor believes that a 
market-dominating patent is valid or may be held valid by a 
court, it should rationally be deterred from entering the mar-
ket, even if that patent is, in fact, invalid.86 
2.  Increased Costs of Market Entry Caused by the  
Existence of Invalid Patents 
The mere existence of a patent, valid or not, imposes many 
additional costs for a new firm considering entry into the mar-
ket. Normally, start-up costs affect market entry. These costs 
generally include acquiring necessary physical inputs, hiring 
employees, raising capital, and the like. In a market dominated 
by one firm with a critical patent, a competitor cannot enter the 
market without first determining whether its own product 
 
 83. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Walker Process 
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (No. 602), re-
printed in ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 737. 
 84. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. 
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (No. 602), reprinted in ANTI-
TRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 765, 784 (statement of 
Charles J. Merriam on behalf of petitioner). 
 85. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 274. 
 86. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 31 (“In recent testi-
mony before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property, the AIPLA stated that ‘[l]arge and small 
companies are increasingly being subjected to litigation (or its threat) on the 
basis of questionable patents.’ As noted earlier, invalid patents that confer 
market power unnecessarily thwart competition.” (footnote omitted)). 
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would infringe the existing patent and, if so, whether that pat-
ent is valid.87 In short, a new entrant concerned about infring-
ing an existing patent must pay to investigate the patent’s 
scope and validity. Validity searches can be expensive and take 
a significant amount of time to conduct.88 In addition to attor-
neys’ fees, the firm considering market entry may have to pay 
engineers or others with an appropriate technical background 
to determine whether a particular patent is valid.89 New com-
petitors also must spend money to determine whether their 
new product will infringe that patent. 
All of these costs pose a barrier to entry, and while they 
may not be an insurmountable barrier, each additional cost in-
creases the risk that a potential entrant will find it uneconom-
ical to compete against the patent-holder. At a minimum, the 
new market entrant must recoup the money spent on these 
costs, which will make it a less aggressive price competitor—
the greater the start-up costs to recover, the higher the initial 
product price. The increased price harms consumers and bene-
fits the initial monopolist, who can still charge a higher price 
than it would if the new competitor had a less expensive mar-
ket entry. 
These costs, as well as the threat of infringement litigation, 
may lead risk-averse potential competitors—or those unaware 
of a patent’s doubtful validity—to seek licenses from the pat-
ent-holder. When the royalty payment demanded by the pat-
entee is below the expected cost of litigation, a new competitor 
may accede to the demands. As a result, invalid patents also 
increase competitors’ costs by inducing them to pay unjustified 
license fees.90 In its report on patent law and competition, the 
 
 87. For a general discussion of why potential infringers should obtain ad-
vice of counsel prior to market entry, see Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 88. See Jeffery, supra note 19, at 789 (“Such ‘validity searches’ are ex-
tremely exhaustive investigations conducted primarily for litigation purposes, 
span several weeks, and consider every possible relevant publication—no mat-
ter how remote.”). But see Lemley, supra note 5, at 1510 (assuming prior art 
search costs to be between $5000 and $7000). 
 89. In many cases it would be exceedingly difficult for a new entrant to 
determine whether a patent is invalid. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 90. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
338 (1971) (arguing that “prospective [infringers] will often decide that paying 
royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the costly burden 
of challenging the patent,” even if they believe that the patent is invalid); 
MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 962–65 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(noting that plaintiff-appellant MedImmune argued it only continued to pay 
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FTC noted: 
If the royalties are less than the expected value of potential litigation 
costs, firms may prefer to pay for the license. A number of panelists 
indicated that small firms, unable to bear the costs of litigation, are 
particularly likely to be forced to license, although some noted that 
large firms, with greater exposure, are also subject to in terrorem ef-
fects. In either case, entering an unnecessary license reduces the li-
censees’ rewards and distorts their incentives to innovate or com-
pete.91 
In the event competitors cannot uncover the flaws of an in-
valid patent and opt not to take a license, they will have to in-
vest additional funds into creating a noninfringing alternative 
product in order to enter the market.92 Some courts have as-
serted that one benefit of the patent system is its “so-called 
‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s products, 
even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of in-
novations to the marketplace.”93 But viewing such designing 
around as a benefit assumes the patent was properly issued. If 
the patentee knows its patent is invalid while others do not, 
then compelling its competitors to design around that patent is 
simply a mechanism to raise rivals’ costs illegitimately.94 Fur-
 
royalties to avoid being sued by defendant-appellee, but declining to grant 
MedImmune standing to challenge the validity of the patent in question), cert. 
granted, 126 S.Ct. 1329 (2006). 
 91. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 2–3. The problem is 
by no means new. One commentator noted: 
[T]he major defect of the Patent Act of 1793, which remained the law 
of the land until 1836, [was] . . . that anyone could obtain a patent for 
anything, merely by paying the requisite fee and meeting the ministe-
rial requirements imposed. It mattered not that the supposed inven-
tion had already been patented or had long been known and used. 
The threat of litigation was sufficient for the owners of apparently in-
valid patents to obtain substantial royalties from literally hundreds 
and thousands of farmers, small businessmen, and artisans for whom 
it truly was cheaper to pay than to be involved in expensive and per-
haps ruinous litigation. 
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—An Early Patent Controversy, 
79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 533, 533 (1997). 
 92. See, e.g., FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 2, at 22. 
 93. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); see also WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[P]atent law encourages competitors to design or invent 
around existing patents.”). 
 94. See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text. Although some argue 
that it is easy enough to design around a patent, design around attempts 
nonetheless occasionally result in liability for patent infringement. See Craig 
Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 
793–94 (1999) (discussing Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735 
(Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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thermore, in many cases the product created through the de-
sign-around process is not better than the existing product (il-
legitimately protected by an invalid patent) and thus the proc-
ess creates no social utility despite the significant investment 
of societal resources.95 For example, in the FTC hearings on 
patents and competition, experts in the software industry 
“complained that design-around efforts may prove costly, dupli-
cative, wasteful, and sometimes technologically impossible.”96 
In short, the costs of attempting to invent around an invalid 
patent constitute a barrier to entry imposed by the holder of 
the invalid patent. 
3. Delay of Market Entry 
Even if entry occurs before an invalid patent expires, a 
dominant firm’s maintenance of an invalid patent can never-
theless delay competitors’ entry into the market. As noted 
above, a competitor must investigate whether a market-
dominating patent is, in fact, valid and likely infringed.97 This 
investigation can delay market entry for months.98 
Infringement litigation involving invalid patents tends to 
further delay entry. When there is litigation over the patent’s 
validity, the time between the filing of litigation and the ulti-
mate invalidation of a patent can be several years.99 The ability 
of invalid patents to so delay entry is hardly new. Over half a 
century ago, Joseph Borkin described a case in which 
 
 95. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 2, at 22 (“In still other 
contexts the design-around may add little value, merely requiring that com-
petitors ‘work harder to get to the same place.’”). 
 96. Id. ch. 3, at 50. 
 97. See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Ad-
ministrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
112–15 (1997) (discussing the benefits of pre-grant publication of patent appli-
cations). 
 98. See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1502 (“Validity requires a great deal of 
attention, however. In contrast to the eighteen hours an examiner will spend 
on a patent from start to finish, lawyers and technical experts will spend hun-
dreds and perhaps even thousands of hours searching for and reading prior 
art, poring over the specification and prosecution history, and preparing and 
defending invalidity arguments.”). 
 99. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948) (“The striking feature of the record is that, although the first suit was 
filed in 1930, the patents were not judicially considered until 1940.”); Lemley, 
supra note 5, at 1520 (“Indeed, the average time between the issuance of a 
patent that would later be litigated and a final decision on its validity in liti-
gation was 8.6 years. For many patents, the validity decision was not made 
until thirteen or fourteen years after the patent issued.”). 
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the almost prohibitory expense involved in the defending of an in-
fringement suit gave the Carboloy Corporation many years time in 
which to build up an entrenched position in the cemented carbide 
field—a position based almost entirely on invalid patents. It was only 
after an unusually tenacious independent, spurning all offers of com-
promise, had forced Carboloy to carry the patents through to adjudi-
cation that the door was finally opened to competition. It is to be re-
gretted that this result did not occur some twelve years earlier.100 
Being denied a license can delay competitors from entering 
a market controlled by a patent.101 But even if a competitor 
seeks to avoid patent infringement litigation by acquiring a li-
cense, this too introduces delay.102 Engaging in the process of 
negotiating for a license costs competitors money and delays 
market entry, regardless of the negotiation’s outcome.103 
Case law illustrates how invalid patents can delay market 
entry. Again, Walker Process is instructive. Although there 
were rumors that FMC’s patents were invalid, no other com-
petitor entered the market, and it took four years after hearing 
these rumors for Walker Process to work up the courage to roll 
the dice and sell an infringing device.104 In short, for several 
years FMC’s invalid patent successfully delayed market en-
try.105 
A monopolist can profit handsomely by delaying competitor 
entry into the market. In the pharmaceutical reverse-payment 
cases, the makers of a patented drug were willing to pay tens of 
millions of dollars to the makers of generic drugs in exchange 
for delaying market entry for a few months.106 Delayed entry is 
particularly important in those technology markets where the 
useful life of the patented product is less than five years. In 
such cases, by the time that competitors enter the market, the 
patent-holder has often extracted all of the value from the ex-
clusionary power of the patent, even though it was invalid. 
 
 100. Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit—Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 634, 644 (1950). 
 101. See Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1157–58 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1158. 
 104. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 3, reprinted in ANTI-
TRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 745 (statement of 
Charles J. Merriam on behalf of petitioner). 
 105. Astonishingly, FMC brought an infringement suit, even though its in-
valid patent would expire in a few months. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 
1297, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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But the holder of the invalid patent can, by delaying com-
petitors’ entry, gain more than simply short-term profits until 
competitors eventually enter the market. In general, there is 
often a first-mover advantage in business.107 Maintaining a 
patent—even an invalid patent—that increases the patentee’s 
lead time can thus increase profits both immediately and in the 
long run. Even if the patent is later invalidated, the delay in 
competitors’ market entry may give the patentee a significant 
advantage. Between the time the patent is issued and the time 
it is invalidated, consumer loyalty and other business relation-
ships may take hold.108 The longer an invalid patent remains in 
the market, the greater the chance for longer-term anticompeti-
tive effects. Discussing business method patents, Professor Ro-
chelle Dreyfuss noted that in the period between patent issu-
ance and invalidation, a market can experience shake outs in 
which efficient firms are driven from the market.109 Unfortu-
nately, firms can employ invalid patents to create such profit-
increasing inefficiencies. 
If the holder of the invalid patent secures a sufficient lead 
time under some market structures, the invalidation of the pat-
ent may still not afford competitors a meaningful opportunity 
to compete. Most notably, in markets characterized by network 
effects,110 a patented product may become entrenched as the 
standard and remain the standard even upon patent invalida-
tion or expiration. This result may be particularly prevalent 
with business method patents.111 Thus, if there are network or 
lock-in effects, invalidating the patent will not necessarily re-
duce a patentee’s sales significantly even after the patent is in-
validated. 
In sum, even if an invalid patent does not foreclose compe-
tition completely, the maintenance of an invalid patent can de-
 
 107. See Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 270. 
 108. See, e.g., id. (“In some fields, there is another, more enduring, prob-
lem. Take law and medicine: substantial relationships are built (lawyer and 
client, doctor and patient). Once loyalty develops, whatever business method 
drew the client to the provider becomes irrelevant . . . .”). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competi-
tion, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (describing net-
work effects as a characteristic of “products for which the utility that a user 
derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other 
agents consuming the good”). 
 111. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 271–72; see also Thomas, supra note 7, at 
321 (“In sum, patent rights, even ones of dubious validity and limited lifespan, 
appear to accelerate the anticompetitive aspects of information products.”). 
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ter market entry. Because delayed entry is inefficient and anti-
competitive, courts have held that “improperly prolonging a 
monopoly is as much an offense against the Sherman Act as is 
wrongfully acquiring market power in the first place.”112 This 
insight should be applied to Walker Process jurisprudence. 
4. Scaring Away Competitors’ Customers and Venture Capital 
The presence of an invalid patent can also prevent a mar-
ket entrant from entering into necessary business relation-
ships. A patent-holder is within its rights to “distribute circu-
lars notifying a competitor’s customers of the pendency of an 
infringement suit and warning them of similar actions,” so long 
as the patentee’s communications are accurate and its patent is 
valid.113 However, holders of invalid patents sometimes 
threaten to sue the prospective customers of their competitors 
for patent infringement.114 A patent-holder’s statements to the 
market regarding its intent to enforce its patent can deter cus-
tomers from doing business with a potential competitor because 
the customer could possibly be liable for patent infringement.115 
But the patentee need not make explicit threats to disrupt the 
business relationships of its competitors with their customers. 
Rumor and innuendo alone can make customers skittish about 
doing business with a potential infringer.116 No actual enforce-
 
 112. Xechem, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 372 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
 113. Chromium Indus., Inc v. Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F. Supp. 
544, 558–59 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
 114. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1472, 1477 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), discussed in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 
F. Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Dow alleged that Exxon had threatened 
to sue actual and prospective Dow customers for patent infringement, even 
though Exxon allegedly had no good-faith belief that Dow infringed the patent 
when Exxon made the threats and had allegedly obtained the patent by ineq-
uitable conduct.”). 
 115. See Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1157–58 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Sticker Indus. Supply Corp. v. Blaw-Knox Co., 367 F.2d 744, 
747 (7th Cir. 1966); Borkin, supra note 100, at 641 (“Contributory infringe-
ment is a potent discouragement to buyers, . . . and can serve as an effective 
side-attack to cut off the economic support of a small producer.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 
2003) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Finally, Ray-
chem informed its customers that Bourns’ potential PPTC products would be 
in violation of its patents.”); Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1044, 
1047 (D. Colo. 1998) (stipulating as fact that in the case at bar, one letter from 
the patent-holder’s attorney was sufficient to cause the customer to dissolve a 
business deal with competitor). 
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ment, or even a direct threat of litigation, is required to create 
anticompetitive effects. 
Customer fears of infringement litigation can impose a 
powerful chill on new entry into the market. While a new com-
petitor may risk an infringement suit because it is the only way 
to enter that market, its customers can always take the low-
risk route of buying products from the patentee or its licensees. 
If a firm’s customers are scared away because of fear of in-
fringement suits for buying from the patentee’s competitors, 
then that firm cannot make sales and will likely not survive in 
the market. If the patent that deters customers from purchas-
ing from a competitor is invalid, then the patent-holder is gain-
ing market share through improper exclusionary conduct. At a 
minimum, the specter of possible litigation will increase the 
cost of market entry, as the new competitor must negotiate 
with its own customers, quell their fears, and perhaps even 
agree to indemnify them.117 
Even if the potential upstart concludes that the dominant 
firm’s patent is invalid, it may have difficulty getting the fi-
nancing necessary to enter the market when its product clearly 
infringes an existing—albeit invalid—patent. Venture capital-
ists do not eagerly embrace business models based on a product 
that infringes the patent of a dominant player when assertions 
of invalidity cannot be tested before entering the market.118 
Litigation costs and unnecessary licensing fees could prove 
prohibitive for a start-up and could make it much more difficult 
to raise the necessary funds, as venture capitalists see increas-
ing costs and decreasing potential market share.119 As a result, 
the “threat of being sued for infringement by an incumbent—
even on a meritless claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital 
financing.”120 If a new firm is unable to obtain necessary financ-
 
 117. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 
731, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Am. Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting 
Mills, Inc., 379 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1967); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, 
L.P., No. 3-03-CV-1927-M, 2004 WL 981079, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2004). 
 118. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 995 n.15 (9th Cir. 
1979) (“Mr. Campbell, a past employee of [a venture capital lender], also testi-
fied that his company would not become involved in underwriting the sale of 
Handgards’s stock, because of the pendency of the infringement suit.”). 
 119. Cf. id. at 991 (noting the alleged infringer’s argument that it “found 
itself unable to obtain outside financing necessary for it to remain competitive 
in the industry” following the initiation of patent litigation). 
 120. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 2, at 8 (quoting Competi-
tion and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Econ-
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ing, then it could be excluded from the market entirely. If the 
threat of litigation increases the cost of capital, the incumbent 
will be a less efficient competitor. Either way, the holder of the 
invalid patent profits by deterring market entry. 
5. Reduction of Consumer Welfare and Innovation 
By deterring market entry and allowing the patent-holder 
to behave like a monopolist (in those situations where the pat-
ent confers market power), invalid patents can result in supra-
competitive pricing, reduced quantity, and the attendant dead-
weight loss. Society may be willing to accept these conse-
quences when a patent is valid; but if the patent is invalid, 
these high costs are imposed on society without any counter-
vailing benefits.121 When the patentee knows its patent is inva-
lid and yet is able to act like a monopolist, the patentee inflicts 
antitrust injury on consumers.122 
In addition to the usual harms associated with monopoly 
pricing, deterring competitors through the maintenance of in-
valid patents can distort product improvements. Because “im-
provements on the patent cannot be practiced without the per-
mission of the patentee,”123 competitors fearful of infringement 
litigation may decline to invest in research and development 
(R&D) in areas tainted by invalid (but unexposed) patents.124 
At the FTC hearings, panelists suggested that “improperly 
awarded patents may distort firms’ research choices and influ-
ence them to shun whole areas of R&D activity.”125 This reac-
 
omy: FTC/DOJ Hearings (2002) (statement of Harvard Business School Pro-
fessor Joshua Lerner)). 
 121. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 816 (1945) (“A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. 
. . . [It] is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right 
to access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and economic con-
sequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in see-
ing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other 
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate 
scope.”). 
 122. Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 61, at 1019 (arguing that enforcement 
of invalid patents distorts competitive pricing). 
 123. Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 735. 
 124. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1060 (2005). 
 125. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 2. Particularly in bio-
technology markets, firms may “avoid infringing questionable patents and 
therefore will refrain from entering or continuing with a particular field of re-
search that such patents appear to cover. Such effects deter market entry and 
follow-on innovation by competitors and increase the potential for the holder of 
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tion harms consumers by stifling technological advancement. 
While it is possible that some competitors may design around 
the patent, in at least some instances competitors may be de-
terred by these additional entry costs.126 Moreover, consumers 
will have to pay these additional research costs, which firms 
would not have had to incur if they did not have to design 
around the invalid patent. 
6. Willful Ignorance of Invalid Patents? 
There are some arguments for the proposition that invalid 
patents do not distort market entry. One possibility is that a 
firm that is considering whether to enter a new market may 
make a conscious decision not to do a patent search. The mere 
ownership of a patent can only deter entry if the new competi-
tor actually knows the patent exists (independent of whether it 
suspects the patent is invalid). Some evidence suggests that 
some new entrants do not actually search the PTO’s patent da-
tabase to determine whether they might be infringing an exist-
ing patent.127 Some scholars argue that, at least in some cases, 
firms do not search for patents because if the firm were aware 
of a patent and proceeded anyway, any infringement would be 
considered willful, and the company would be liable for treble 
damages.128 Companies determined to enter a market may thus 
decide against investigating the presence of patents. 
While this scholarship no doubt accurately describes the 
behavior of some firms, many new entrants go to great pains to 
insure that their products and processes are not, in fact, in-
fringing an issued patent. Thus, while many companies do not 
search for patents, many others do, and they may be deterred 
 
a questionable patent to suppress competition.” Id. Executive Summary, at 5–
6, see also id. ch. 3, at 54 (“Questionable patents may have a disproportionally 
adverse impact on entry by small firms and individuals who lack the resources 
to challenge such patents. As one software programmer commented, ‘the ease 
with which the US Patent Office has been granting patents in the last few 
years has already dampened my plans to write software as a primary busi-
ness.’” (citation omitted)). 
 126. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Will-
fulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100–01 (2003) (“[I]n-house pat-
ent counsel and many outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to 
read patents if there is any way to avoid it.”). 
 128. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 
123, 142–43 (2006); Lemley & Tangri, supra note 127, at 1089. 
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from entry by an existing, but invalid, patent.129 Furthermore, 
many patentees—including some that hold invalid patents—
advertise the existence of their patents. Finally, if willful igno-
rance describes most firms’ behavior, then even valid patents 
would not deter market entry. After all, if a firm pursues the 
willful ignorance strategy, then the firm will be ignorant of all 
patents, whether valid or not. But there is much evidence to 
indicate that the presence of valid patents does, in fact, deter 
firms from entering markets when they fear an infringement 
lawsuit.130 In sum, instances of willful ignorance do not negate 
the fact that there may be instances when the presence of inva-
lid patents nevertheless deters market entry.131 
B. INVALID PATENTS CAN DETER MARKET ENTRY REGARDLESS 
OF WHETHER OTHER FIRMS KNOW OR SUSPECT INVALIDITY. 
It might seem that an invalid patent would not deter com-
petitors who suspect or strongly believe that the patent is inva-
lid. But invalid patents can distort competition regardless of 
the state of competitors’ knowledge. This Subsection argues 
that a monopolist’s mere maintenance of an invalid patent 
could deter competition in three scenarios: (1) where a potential 
competitor has no basis for thinking the patent is invalid; (2) 
where a potential competitor strongly believes that the patent 
is invalid and has some basis for its belief; and (3) where a po-
tential competitor suspects the patent is invalid, but has insuf-
ficient proof to establish invalidity. In all of these situations, 
the mere ownership of an invalid patent could be exclusionary. 
1. No Basis for Thinking a Patent is Invalid 
The belief that a patent is valid deters entry by competi-
tors.132 If patents deter market entry generally, then invalid 
patents will deter market entry just as effectively as valid pat-
ents when the invalidity is unknown. A rational competitor will 
 
 129. To the extent that a potential competitor does not know about a mo-
nopolist’s patent, the causation requirement will prevent that competitor from 
bringing a cause of action for the patentee’s refusal to disavow an invalid pat-
ent. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing causation). 
 130. See Nard, supra note 94, at 759. 
 131. When the invalid patent does deter entry, resulting in monopoly 
power for the patentee, then Section Two of the Sherman Act is implicated. 15 
U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Of course, if the new entrant does in fact enter the market, 
then it has no Section Two claim based on the maintenance of an invalid pat-
ent. 
 132. See Nard, supra note 94, at 759. 
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not enter a market protected by patents when entry necessarily 
entails infringement of those patents and the competitor per-
ceives the patents to be valid.133 
In many instances, a potential competitor may have no rea-
son to know that a patent is invalid even if the patent-holder 
knows with certainty that its patent is invalid. An issued pat-
ent may turn out to be invalid for a variety of reasons, but 
many of the bases for invalidation are difficult for outside com-
petitors to evaluate. This section will discuss three scenarios in 
which a patentee could likely know its patent is invalid while 
its competitors would not: the on-sale bar, the public-use bar, 
and the public knowledge bar. 
First, a patentee may know its patent is invalid while its 
competitors do not because the patent is invalid under the on-
sale bar. Section 102(b) of the Patent Act provides that a patent 
should not issue if anyone sold or offered to sell the patented 
invention in the United States more than one year before the 
patent application’s filing date.134 A single offer to sell triggers 
the on-sale bar.135 In most cases, potential competitors would 
have no way of knowing whether the patentee concealed an of-
fer for sale more than a year before the critical date.136 This is 
not public information that is collected in any meaningful way 
or stored in any central location. Ordinarily, only the patentee 
could know with any certainty.137 
 
 133. See id. (noting “the patentee’s ability to send a clearly defined mes-
sage of deterrence to competitors”). 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 135. A.B. Chance Co. v. RTE Corp., 854 F.2d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
see also In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 
1304 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (“The ‘on-sale bar’ does not require sustained commercial 
activity, advertising, or displays. On the contrary, a single sale or even a sin-
gle offer to sell is sufficient to trigger the statutory bar.” (citing In re Caveney, 
761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir.1985))). The offer need not be accepted to implicate 
the on-sale bar. See Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: As-
sessing Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications 
for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 751, 771–73 (2003) (discussing standards for the on-sale bar). 
 136. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, The More They 
Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest 
for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 965 (2000) 
(“[A]n offer need not be generally publicly available.”). 
 137. Even the offeree may not know the patent is invalid given that most 
offerees would not follow the patent application process more than a year after 
a turned-down offer. And the potential competitor might not have any reason 
to know of the offeree’s existence. 
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Second, Section 102(b) also precludes the issuance of a pat-
ent if anyone has made public use of the invention more than 
one year before the patent application was filed. 138 Because the 
use must be “public,” it would seem that competitors could eas-
ily discover whether this bar makes a patent invalid. However, 
the concept of public use for patent purposes is quite expansive; 
even relatively clandestine uses can trigger Section 102(b). The 
Federal Circuit has held that “an inventor’s own prior commer-
cial use, albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use or sale 
under § 102(b), barring him from obtaining a patent.”139 Even 
when the inventor takes explicit action to keep the patent se-
cret, if it used the claimed invention for commercial advantage 
more than one year before filing for a patent, the public use bar 
precludes a patent from issuing. Should the PTO nevertheless 
issue the patent unaware of the secret conduct, that patent is 
rightly considered invalid.140 Despite a patent’s invalidity un-
der these applications of the public use bar, a potential com-
petitor deterred from entering the market for fear of infringing 
the patent would have no basis for knowing of the patent’s in-
validity. In short, the public use bar to patentability could ren-
der a patent invalid in a manner that would keep potential 
competitors unaware of the patent’s invalidity. 
Third, a patentee may know about some bases for invalid-
ity when its competitors do not, even though neither has special 
access to the necessary information; one example is prior 
knowledge or use. Under Section 102(a), a patent should not is-
sue if the described “invention was known to or used by others 
in this country before the date of the patentee’s invention.”141 
The sources of patent-precluding public knowledge include 
“[e]very book, journal article, leaflet, and student thesis pub-
 
 138. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 139. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881), for the 
proposition that an “inventor’s unobservable prior use was a ‘public use’”). 
 140. See New Railhead Mfg., LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 
1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The statutory phrase ‘public use’ does not necessarily 
mean open and visible in the ordinary sense; it includes any use of the claimed 
invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, re-
striction, or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.”); TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof ’l 
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Nor, it must be added, is all 
secret use ipso facto not ‘public use’ within the meaning of the statute, if the 
inventor is making commercial use of the invention under circumstances 
which preserve its secrecy.”); 1 IRVING KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE § 4.41 (6th 
ed. 1995). 
 141. Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1370. 
LESLIE_5FMT 12/1/2006 8:54:00 AM 
132 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:101 
 
lished anywhere in the world in any language.”142 It can be ex-
ceedingly difficult for either a patent applicant or its competi-
tors to uncover relevant prior art, especially when it is buried 
in arcane or hard-to-find texts. However, when the patentee 
has been in the business longer—with a larger workforce of re-
searchers—the patentee is more likely than a would-be com-
petitor to know of the patent-invalidating public knowledge or 
use. Such informational asymmetry can profoundly impact 
competition. 
In sum, all three of the above scenarios show that relevant 
prior art can be relatively inaccessible to potential competitors 
even if the patentee is aware of it, and in some cases, the pat-
entee will be uniquely positioned to know about prior art. If the 
evidence of a patent’s invalidity is solely within the control of 
the patentee, and if would-be entrants do not suspect the mo-
nopolist’s patent to be invalid, then the monopolist may hold 
onto its market power through deception, rather than through 
efficiency, superior product, or ingenuity of product or process. 
2. Strong Belief That a Patent is Invalid 
Even when a potential entrant believes with reasonable 
certainty that the dominant firm’s relevant patent is invalid, 
that patent could still potentially deter the would-be competitor 
from entering the market. Judge Posner has argued that if a 
potential competitor believes that the monopolist’s patent is in-
valid, then the new entrant can simply enter the market.143 
The monopolist will respond in one of two ways: do nothing or 
enforce its patent. If the monopolist does nothing, then the new 
entrant can compete.144 If the monopolist enforces the patent—
either by threatening litigation or by actually filing suit—then 
the new competitor can counterclaim under Section Two of the 
Sherman Act using either a Walker Process or Handgards 
claim, depending on the reasons for the patent’s invalidity.145 
Under the first scenario, if the monopolist initially does nothing 
the competitor will endure the constant (albeit unexpressed) 
threat of litigation, which can dissuade both customers and 
 
 142. Thomas, supra note 7, at 313. 
 143. Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[A] patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage com-
petitors from making the patented product or using the patented process.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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venture capitalists from fully engaging with the new entrant.146 
Under the second scenario, the company risks losing the litiga-
tion and going bankrupt, even if the patent is in fact invalid. 
Even if the would-be competitor successfully defends against 
the infringement suit, the anticipated litigation costs can be so 
high as to deter market entry.147 
A competitor who strongly believes that the dominant 
firm’s patent is invalid may still be reluctant to enter the mar-
ket because of the difficulty of prevailing in court. Patent law 
includes several legal presumptions that make it hard for the 
infringement defendant to prove patent invalidity as a defense. 
Courts treat patents issued by the PTO as “presumptively 
valid.”148 This presumption of validity applies even to evidence, 
such as prior art, that the PTO was never aware of and never 
considered.149 The presumption means that persons challenging 
the validity of a patent must prove their arguments by clear 
and convincing evidence, rather than a mere preponderance.150 
This evidentiary standard “may work to undermine the role 
contemplated by the patent system for court challenges to weed 
out faulty patents.”151 
Furthermore, federal courts have increased the chal-
lenger’s burden of proving the invalidity of an issued patent by 
rejecting arguments of prior use based on testimonial evidence 
if the testimony is not also corroborated by documentary proof 
 
 146. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 59–79 and accompanying text. 
 148. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994)). 
 149. Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The 
presentation of evidence that was not before the examiner does not change the 
presumption of validity.”). 
 150. See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); Laitram Mach., Inc. v. Carnitech A/S, 884 F. Supp. 1074, 1084 (E.D. La. 
1995). 
Thus, an infringement defendant relying upon the public use doctrine has 
a burden of proving such use with clear and convincing evidence. See Allied 
Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Simi-
larly, any prior sale that would invalidate the patent under the on-sale bar 
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 
996 F.Supp. 1044, 1053 (D. Colo. 1997) (citing Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo 
Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir.1987)). 
 151. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 27 (noting concerns 
of District Judge Ellis); see also id. Executive Summary, at 8 (questioning the 
clear and convincing evidence standard as applied to the patent validity issue). 
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or the testimony of an additional witness.152 No matter how 
credible an individual witness, the Federal Circuit has held 
that uncorroborated testimonial “evidence is insufficient as a 
matter of law to establish invalidity of the patent. This is not a 
judgment that [the witness’s] testimony is incredible, but sim-
ply that such testimony alone cannot surmount the hurdle that 
the clear and convincing evidence standard imposes in proving 
patent invalidity.”153 This leads to the anomalous situation 
where some “permissible sources of prior art, such as sales of-
fers or knowledge, need not have been formally documented at 
all,”154 while the party challenging the patent’s validity never-
theless needs documentation if another informed witness is not 
available to testify. These evidentiary burdens can be too great 
for a competitor to overcome, and it may decline to enter the 
market even when it believes the patent in question is, in fact, 
invalid. 
In addition to the evidentiary hurdles, any competitor con-
sidering infringement en route to market entry would be aware 
that the litigation costs of any subsequent infringement suit 
could be astronomical. Patent litigation costs measure in the 
billions,155 the average cost per suit in the millions.156 In fields 
such as biotechnology, the anticipated litigation costs can ex-
ceed the expected revenue of market participation.157 Given the 
costs of patent litigation, even if a firm is convinced that its ri-
val’s patent is invalid, the firm may conclude that it is more 
beneficial to license the patent than to challenge its validity.158 
Uncertainty increases the deterrent effect of invalid pat-
ents. While the result of any litigation is uncertain, it is par-
 
 152. See Finnigan Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 1369–
70 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 153. Id. at 1370 (citing Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1577 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 154. Thomas, supra note 7, at 313. 
 155. See Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & 
ECON. 463, 470 (1995) (“[T]he patent litigation within USPTO and the federal 
courts begun in 1991 will lead to total legal expenditures (in 1991 dollars) of 
about $1 billion, a substantial amount relative to the $3.7 billion spent by U.S. 
firms on basic research in 1991.”); Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 61, at 1014 
(“In the real world, infringement litigation carries with it significant costs.”). 
 156. AIPLA ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 75, at 22. A patentee’s efforts 
at concealing an invalid patent can increase litigation costs even further.  
 157. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 3, at 22. 
 158. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Borkin, supra note 100, at 641 (“[W]ith respect to competition, the fact of liti-
gation may in itself be decisive, regardless of any outcome in court.”). 
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ticularly so in patent infringement suits because courts rou-
tinely make mistakes in patent litigation.159 Federal judges 
themselves sometimes admit that in patent litigation “it is 
well-known that courts are far from error-free.”160 
The only thing more fear-inspiring to the infringement de-
fendant than a bench trial is a jury trial. Juries are signifi-
cantly more likely to rule for a plaintiff-patentee than are 
judges.161 Patent juries favor patentees and are more likely to 
find that a patent is both valid and infringed. In her compre-
hensive empirical study of all patent cases that went to trial 
during the seventeen-year period of 1983–99, Professor Kim-
berly Moore found that juries were “significantly pro-patentee 
in suits for infringement,” with patentees winning sixty-eight 
percent of the time.162 Jury consultants that study juror percep-
tions have concluded that juries believe that “patents are al-
most impossible to get, . . . they last forever, . . . they can’t be 
invalidated,” that “patent applications are thoroughly reviewed 
by the Patent Office, and [that] patent applicants don’t lie.”163 
In addition, juries defer to the perceived expertise of the PTO, 
which issued the patent as valid.164 Any jury errors are 
unlikely to be corrected on appeal. Professor Moore explains 
that 
the standard of review the court employs when reviewing jury ver-
dicts on factual questions, substantial evidence, is highly deferential. 
. . . [A]nd more importantly, the black box nature of jury verdicts 
makes them virtually unreviewable. Without any insight into the de-
 
 159. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve 
Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2001) (finding that district court 
judges improperly construe patent claim language in one-third of cases ap-
pealed to the Federal Circuit). 
 160. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 540 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 161. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Em-
pirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 386 (2000) (“When the 
jury is the adjudicator, the patent holder prevails in 63% of all claims and 68% 
of all suits. When the judge is the adjudicator, the patent holder succeeds in 
49% of all claims and 51% of all suits.”). 
 162. Id. at 213 (noting that the patentee won thirty-eight percent of the 
cases when defending against a declaratory judgment action). 
 163. Nicholas M. Cannella & Timothy J. Kelly, Jury Trials and Mock Jury 
Trials, in PRACTICING LAW INST., PATENT LITIGATION 1993, at 731, 741–42 
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property, Handbook Se-
ries No. G-375, 1993). 
 164. See ETHAN HOROWITZ & LESTER HOROWITZ, PATENT LITIGATION: PRO-
CEDURE & TACTICS § 2.02[6] (1971). 
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cision-making process, the court is unable to assess the accuracy of 
the decision or its analysis.165 
As a result, “the Federal Circuit has limited ability to identify 
and correct jury inadequacies.”166 Despite these problems, the 
alleged infringer cannot easily escape a pro-patentee jury, since 
the plaintiff suing for damages has a constitutional right to a 
jury trial.167 
All of this bodes ill for the patent infringement defendant. 
Professor Moore’s empirical findings “suggest that the patent 
holder has an edge on almost every issue in front of any adjudi-
cator.”168 This advantage must affect the mindset of potential 
market entrants, and the perceptions of would-be competitors 
are key. If potential entrants believe that juries will be biased 
against them, they are less likely to infringe by entering the 
market. At a minimum, this perception injects a large measure 
of uncertainty into patent litigation. Unfortunately, courts have 
talked about this uncertainty as a reason to protect the pat-
entee.169 But this uncertainty also deters new entrants even 
when a patent is invalid. 
Given the risk of judicial error and staggering damages 
imposed against infringers, basic cost-benefit analysis may dic-
tate against entering a market covered by an invalid patent, 
even if the competitor thinks it is more likely than not that it 
will win the litigation. For a new firm without high cash re-
serves and whose main product has just been challenged in 
court, inviting or defending against patent infringement litiga-
tion is a bet-the-company business strategy. If a federal court 
were to conclude incorrectly that an invalid patent is valid, 
then the new company would be driven into bankruptcy. If the 
likely costs (i.e., the probability of losing the infringement suit 
multiplied by the damages from losing, plus litigation costs) are 
greater than the expected profits from selling potentially in-
 
 165. Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases and a Lack of Transparency, 
39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 790–91 (2002). 
 166. Moore, supra note 161, at 401. 
 167. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377 
(1996); In re Tech. Licensing Corp., 423 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (per 
curiam) (holding that the patentee suing only for injunctive relief does not 
have a constitutional right to trial by jury). 
 168. Moore, supra note 161, at 391. 
 169. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. 
Supp. 2d 514, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he asymmetries of risk inherent in 
Hatch-Waxman patent litigation and the high profits at stake could induce 
even a confident patentee to pay a substantial sum in settlement.”). 
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fringing products, then the rational firm will not compete even 
though the product is not protected by a valid patent. In other 
words, the stakes are high and many rational firms avoid such 
high-stakes gambits. 
In conclusion, the cost of the infringement suit could deter 
a potential competitor from entering the market (in a way that 
infringes the invalid patent) even if the competitor believes 
that it would ultimately prevail in the litigation.170 It is simply 
too risky to produce the potentially infringing product and in-
vite a lawsuit. Courts reach the wrong results in patent cases 
too often. As a result, the cost of the litigation and the risk of 
losing combine to make non-entry the rational business deci-
sion. 
3. Mere Suspicion of Patent Invalidity 
For the same reasons that a firm that is confident that a 
monopolist’s patent is invalid might not enter the market, a 
firm merely suspicious of patent invalidity could be deterred as 
well. Being dubious of a dominant firm’s patent, would-be com-
petitors might approach the monopolist and express their sus-
picions. But this action triggers no duty upon the patent-holder 
to admit the invalidity of a patent that the patentee knows to 
be invalid, or to investigate the rumor. Neither patent law nor 
antitrust law aids the suspicious competitor. Patent law im-
poses no relevant continuing duties on patentees, and merely 
being told by one’s competitors that one’s patents are invalid 
does not rise to the level of knowledge that is necessary to trig-
ger Walker Process liability.171 Furthermore, high costs may de-
ter competitors from performing their own investigations.172 
 
 170. The decision to enter the market will be a function of the expected re-
wards of market entry. If the expected rewards of competing exceed the ex-
pected costs of losing an infringement suit (times the probability of being sued 
and losing), then a rational firm may enter despite the suspect patent. How-
ever, if the profits from entry are small relative to the litigation risks, entry 
will be deterred. 
 171. See Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 
1386 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The allegation by an accused infringer that the patent 
is invalid—an assertion frequently made by those charged with infringe-
ment—cannot be turned into evidence that the patentee knew the patent was 
invalid when it instituted an infringement suit.”). 
 172. Even if a potential competitor hears that a monopolist’s patent is po-
tentially invalid, it may cost a significant amount of money to determine 
whether one’s suspicions are accurate. The investigation process may be 
streamlined and become more centralized as patent bounty hunters hone their 
craft. For example, some entrepreneurs have created operations where a pat-
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Even with investigation, it may be too hard for suspicious 
competitors to detect fraud on their own. The Walker Process 
case itself provides an excellent example. Walker Process had 
heard a rumor that the patent of its competitor FMC was inva-
lid because FMC had made public use of the patent more than 
a year before filing its patent application.173 Walker Process 
approached FMC and asked it to investigate the rumor.174 FMC 
simply refused, correctly noting that it had no such duty.175 Af-
ter FMC filed a patent infringement suit, it still refused to pro-
vide the dates of its first testing and shipment of the patented 
product.176 FMC was eventually forced to produce its internal 
documents,177 which showed clearly that FMC had shipped and 
installed the product more than a year before filing its patent 
application.178 But not until FMC’s suit had been under way for 
almost two years—and long after the patent had expired—did 
Walker Process obtain definitive proof that FMC had sold its 
product before the critical date.179 
The strategy of rolling the dice, entering the market, and 
hoping that one’s suspicions are true (and will be borne out by 
documentary evidence) involves too much risk for many firms. 
A potential entrant’s exposure is particularly great given that 
any infringement could be considered willful because the en-
trant did, in fact, know about the patent. If the finder of fact 
 
ent challenger can pay a fee and post a reward on a website to whoever sub-
mits the necessary documentation to have the patent declared invalid. Long, 
supra note 19, at 670–71. While this perhaps represents an important ad-
vancement in societal efforts to discover invalid patents, it is still inefficient to 
have competitors—whether directly or through surrogates—research patent 
validity when the patentee knows the patent is invalid. 
 173. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food 
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (No. 602), reprinted in ANTITRUST 
BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 593. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, supra note 173, reprinted in 
ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 593–94. 
 177. But for the infringement litigation, the patent-holder would not have 
to produce the incriminating documents. It is exceedingly difficult to deter-
mine the patent-holder’s own prior sale or use, especially if that patent-holder 
refuses to answer a potential competitor’s questions. See supra notes 134–42 
and accompanying text. 
 178. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 173, at 5, reprinted in ANTI-
TRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 594. 
 179. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 84, at 3, reprinted in ANTI-
TRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 745 (statement of 
Charles J. Merriam on behalf of petitioner). 
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concludes the infringement is willful, the defendant could be li-
able for treble damages. Unfortunately, patent juries are seem-
ingly eager to declare infringement “willful.”180 Of course, if the 
new competitor loses the infringement suit and is denied a li-
cense, not only will it suffer potentially crippling damages, it 
will be less likely to recover its start-up costs because it cannot 
sell its product and earn any profit.181 The fear of being in this 
predicament could deter market entry even if the competitor 
suspects the patent that controls the market is invalid. 
4. Summary 
Thus, no matter the competitor’s state of knowledge, an in-
valid patent can successfully deter or prevent market entry. No 
matter how confident a new competitor is that a monopolist’s 
patent is invalid, the competitor’s potential customers and ven-
ture capitalists are unlikely to join forces with the market en-
trant until the patent at issue is either invalidated or has ex-
pired. Risk-averse firms in the field may even avoid entire 
areas of research. In short, the market-blocking, cost-raising 
effects of invalid patents exist regardless of a new competitor’s 
beliefs about the patent’s validity. This can make both fraud 
upon the Patent Office and the knowing maintenance of an in-
valid patent a cost-effective method of monopolization. 
III.  CURRENT LEGAL REGIMES CANNOT ADEQUATELY 
CLEAR THE MARKET OF INVALID PATENTS.   
Although most observers would agree that legal rules 
should discourage fraudulent conduct before the Patent Office, 
our current system does not adequately deter such fraud. Given 
the potential anticompetitive effects of mere maintenance of an 
invalid patent and the minimal sanctions against patentees, 
committing fraud against the PTO can represent a rational 
business strategy. Legal rules must make the costs of fraud be-
fore the PTO outweigh the benefits. This section argues that 
neither patent law nor antitrust law, as currently interpreted, 
render patent fraud not cost-beneficial for the mischievous pat-
entee in search of monopoly power. Thus, it may sometimes be 
rational for a firm to commit fraud against the PTO. 
 
 180. Moore, supra note 161, at 393 (“Juries find willfulness in almost three 
of four cases (71%) and judges only find it half the time (53%), suggesting that 
juries are more easily convinced of an infringer’s thieving intent.”). 
 181. See Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 755. 
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A. PATENT LAW DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY DETER FRAUD AND 
MAINTENANCE OF INVALID PATENTS. 
The patent system relies primarily on the defense of patent 
invalidity (as well as inequitable conduct and non-
infringement) to protect competitors from being excluded from 
the market by fear of infringement litigation. But an invalidity 
defense requires competitors to infringe and risk liability. 
There are several other ways to challenge the validity of a pat-
ent. First, an interested third party can request a reexamina-
tion. Second, a competitor can attempt to get a declaratory 
judgment invalidating an issued patent. Third, there can be a 
public use hearing. This section discusses these mechanisms as 
well as the possibility of post-grant opposition proceedings.182 
1. Reexaminations 
The patent system’s primary mechanism for vetting im-
properly issued patents is the reexamination process.183 The re-
examination of an issued patent can result in the issuance of a 
certificate confirming the original patent claims, amending 
some or all of the claims, or canceling any claim determined to 
be unpatentable.184 The reexamination process exists “to in-
crease the reliability of patents thought to be of doubtful valid-
ity”185 and to “provide a useful and necessary alternative for 
challengers and for patent owners to test the validity of United 
States patents in an efficient and relatively inexpensive man-
 
 182. Additionally, interference hearings can result in invalidation of one or 
both patents involved in an interference proceeding, and patent law provides a 
process for correcting inventorship. Neither of these is a particularly effective 
avenue for competitors to challenge patents in order to open up markets for 
free competition. While the interference proceeding can result in patent in-
validation, it requires the challenger to have a patent himself (or to be apply-
ing for one). See 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2000) (allowing the PTO Director to de-
clare an interference “[w]henever an application is made for a patent 
which . . . would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired 
patent”). The process cannot be used by the competitor seeking market entry 
who has no patent or patent application. 
 183. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2000). 
 184. Id. at § 316; Thomas, supra note 7, at 326–27. 
 185. In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also ROBERT L. 
HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1064 (7th ed. 2005) (“The in-
nate function of the reexamination process is to increase the reliability of the 
PTO’s action in issuing a patent by reexamination of patents thought ‘doubt-
ful.’”). 
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ner.”186 The reexamination procedure was intended to “restor[e] 
confidence in the validity of patents issued by the PTO.”187 It 
has failed. 
There are now two types of reexamination. Until recently, 
reexamination had only been an ex parte proceeding where par-
ties other than the patent-holder could trigger, but not partici-
pate in, the proceeding. This system was not particularly at-
tractive because the person challenging the already issued 
patent had no real voice in the proceedings and no right to ap-
peal any adverse decision.188 Empirically, such reexaminations 
rarely resulted in patent cancellations.189 Indeed, the process 
may have the opposite effect, as “the confirmation of a patent in 
reexamination is accorded a great deal of respect by courts, and 
hence a reexamination can bolster the ‘strength’ of a patent.”190 
While this method of reexamination still exists, it is rarely used 
by third parties wishing to challenge a patent’s validity.191 
As a result of the deficiencies in the traditional reexamina-
tion process, Congress made reexamination broader by creating 
a second type of reexamination: inter partes reexamination.192 
Under this new mechanism, the challenger can submit argu-
ments to the PTO in response to filings by the patent owner 
and can appeal a decision to uphold the patent’s validity.193 
 
 186. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE PATENT AND TRADE-
MARK LAWS, H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463; see also Thomas, supra note 7, at 327 (“Congress in-
tended reexamination to serve as an inexpensive alternative to judicial deter-
minations of patent validity. The fees associated with reexamination are mod-
est compared to patent litigation, which often runs into the millions of dollars. 
Reexamination also allows further access to Patent Office technical expertise 
when additional prior art is discovered after issuance.”). 
 187. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff ’d 
in part and rev’d in part on reh’g, 771 F.2d 480, 488 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 188. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 27; Thomas, su-
pra note 7, at 331. 
 189. Janis, supra note 97, at 47 n.202. 
 190. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 51, at 1210–11. 
 191. Thomas, supra note 7, at 329–30. It is also possible for the Commis-
sioner of the PTO to request a reexamination. See Terri Suzette Hughes, Pat-
ent Reexamination and the PTO: Compton’s Patent Invalidated at the Commis-
sioner’s Request, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 379, 381 (1996). 
This is rare. Id. at 399. The patentee can also ask for a reissue but this is not a 
way to get rid of invalid patents. 
 192. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).  
 193. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2000); see FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 
7, ch. 5, at 16 (“Prior to enactment of a statutory amendment in November 
2002, requesters could not appeal adverse decisions to the federal courts.”); 
Thomas, supra note 7, at 326. 
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However, the party requesting reexamination cannot request 
discovery, conduct cross-examination, or present oral argu-
ments.194 
Additionally, challengers are estopped from raising in any 
subsequent litigation those issues that they raised or could 
have raised in the reexamination.195 This creates a disincentive 
to use inter partes reexamination.196 This effect is unappealing 
to potential challengers, particularly given the lack of discovery 
and complete participation in the reexamination proceeding. 
Thus, the recently expanded mechanism is unlikely to prove ef-
fective.197 Indeed, Professor Thomas has condemned the reex-
amination process “as one of the greatest failures of the modern 
patent system.”198 
2. Declaratory Judgment Actions 
In addition to adjudication within the PTO, competitors 
can seek a declaratory judgment in federal court that another 
firm’s patent is invalid. In theory, the declaratory judgment 
route means that competitors can challenge the validity of a 
suspect patent before it is actually enforced. The Walker Proc-
ess Court seemed to think that declaratory judgment actions 
would solve the problem of invalid patents diminishing compe-
 
 194. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 16. 
 195. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2000). 
 196. See Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481, 493 (2000) (“[Congress] has exacted a 
very high price for participation in an inter partes reexamination.”). 
 197. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 3, at 22 (“The panel-
ists unanimously considered the reexamination procedures as they existed at 
the time of the hearing inadequate for a third party to challenge the validity of 
another party’s patent.”); Janis, supra note 97, at 74 (“As crucial as these 
changes may be to creating an administrative review system that provides a 
litigation alternative, liberalizing third-party participation will accomplish lit-
tle unless accompanied by more fundamental reforms. Unfortunately, the 
third-party participation provisions are embedded in a second-generation re-
examination scheme that was designed primarily to cure governmental de-
fects, and only secondarily to provide a litigation alternative.”); Lemley, supra 
note 5, at 1500 n.17 (“[V]irtually no one is expected to use this system because 
doing so precludes you from challenging the validity of a patent in later litiga-
tion.”); Thomas, supra note 7, at 3330 (“The newly minted inter partes reex-
amination may prove even less popular, with commentators predicting that 
industry will make scant use of these proceedings.”). 
By the time of the FTC hearings, third parties had employed the process 
only four times. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 27. 
 198. Thomas, supra note 7, at 329. 
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tition.199 
But the reality of declaratory judgment actions in this area 
has not lived up to the promise. First, it is exceedingly difficult 
for a competitor who is suspicious, or even certain, of a patent’s 
invalidity to secure standing to pursue a declaratory judgment 
action against a patent-holder. In order to obtain standing, the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff must show 
(1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee which creates a 
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity 
by the declaratory judgment plaintiff which could constitute in-
fringement, or concrete steps taken by the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff with the intent to conduct such activity.200 
With respect to the first element, if there is not an explicit 
threat of suit, courts will consider the totality of the circum-
stances to determine whether a reasonable apprehension ex-
ists.201 
Unfortunately, courts have made it exceedingly difficult for 
threatened competitors seeking declaratory judgments to dem-
onstrate this reasonable apprehension. This burden is perhaps 
most important in the area of licensing negotiations. While it is 
not surprising that a patentee’s request for licensing negotia-
tions does not create a reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit,202 
 
 199. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 
172, 176 (1965) (“In fact, one need not await the filing of a threatened suit by 
the patentee; the validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.”). 
 200. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2005); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 
541 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
This test represents a more stringent one than that which prevailed be-
fore the creation of the Federal Circuit. Professor Lisa Dolak has examined 
how, “[w]ithout explanation, the court replaced the ‘express charge of in-
fringement’ prong of its familiar two-prong reasonable apprehension test with 
a requirement of ‘an explicit threat . . . which creates a reasonable apprehen-
sion on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an in-
fringement suit.’” Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent 
Cases: Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 
38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 929 (1997) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 
885, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 
F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added)). 
 201. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Plumtree Software, Inc. v. Datamize, LLC, No. C-04-2777 
VRW, 2005 WL 2206495, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2005) (quoting Vanguard 
Research, Inc. v. PEAT, Inc., 304 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 202. Ryobi Am. Corp. v. Peters, 815 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D.S.C. 1993); Info-
Sys, Inc. v. Billingnetwork.com, Inc., No. 03 C 3047, 2003 WL 22012687, at *6 
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the Federal Circuit has held that a patent-holder does not cre-
ate a reasonable apprehension of litigation when, during a li-
censing negotiation, it responds affirmatively to the question, 
“Will you enforce your patent?”203 The court reasoned that an 
affirmative answer to such a question from an alleged infringer 
is “merely ‘jawboning’” and is “reflexive and obligatory.”204 As a 
result, courts have essentially created a safe harbor by holding 
that “[t]hreats of litigation within the context of license nego-
tiations . . . do not create a reasonable apprehension.”205 The 
patentee’s strategy is clear: offer a license and threaten away. 
Patentees can make threats without triggering declaratory 
judgment actions by including in their cease and desist letters 
to competitors an offer to license or to talk further.206 It is as if 
a mugger’s demand of “your money or your life” is not a threat, 
but a mere invitation to negotiate. 
In theory, the competitor threatened by a license-offering 
patent-holder could bring suit once the negotiations have bro-
ken down to the point where “further discussion would have 
been ‘fruitless.’”207 But courts have denied the alleged infringer 
standing to pursue a declaratory judgment if the infringer was 
the party that terminated the licensing negotiations.208 Courts 
utterly fail to recognize that this rule allows the holder of an 
invalid patent to start negotiations, to assert patent validity 
while threatening infringement litigation, and to prevent the 
alleged infringer from having standing to pursue declaratory 
relief. The negotiations delay entry while simultaneously pre-
venting the cleansing litigation. 
As with specific threats of litigation made within licensing 
negotiations, broad public proclamations by a patentee “that it 
 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2003) (“[I]t is black letter law that merely offering a license 
does not create a reasonable apprehension.” (citing Phillips Plastics Corp. v. 
Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1995))). 
 203. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 204. Id. Of course, some felons may feel that it is also reflexive and obliga-
tory to lie to federal investigators asking about a crime the felon committed. 
But this lie would constitute an additional crime, not an excuse. Answers to 
questions have legal consequences. They should in the patent context, as well. 
 205. InfoSys, 2003 WL 22012687, at *6. 
 206. See Dataline, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., No. 00 CIV. 1578 
(LAP), 2001 WL 102336, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001); Studio Due, S.r.L. v. 
Vari-Lite, Inc., No. 99 CIV. 11683 (BSJ), 2000 WL 977703, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 14, 2000). 
 207. BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., No. 3-03-CV-1927-M, 2004 WL 
981079, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2004). 
 208. Id. at *4–5. 
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will enforce its patent rights in the courts” do not confer de-
claratory judgment standing, even when followed by direct 
statements to an alleged infringer that it will be “necessary” 
and “required” for the new entrant to license the particular 
patent if it wishes to stay in the market legally.209 Alleged in-
fringers cannot get declaratory judgment standing against a 
patentee who has sued others for infringement while making 
public statements “that the company would not tolerate any in-
fringement of its patent rights and would take legal action 
against any unauthorized use.”210 Along the same lines, courts 
also seem to discount prior litigation by the patentee against 
alleged infringers.211 For example, suing the plaintiff ’s dis-
tributors in another jurisdiction does not create a reasonable 
apprehension of suit in the United States.212 Thus, the holder of 
an invalid patent can directly accuse a rival of patent infringe-
ment but make the threat of litigation to the public generally 
and thereby still prevent a declaratory judgment suit.213 
In one of the easier ways to deny competitors’ standing to 
challenge patent validity, patentees can escape declaratory 
judgment actions by threatening suits through intermediaries, 
such as licensees. Courts have denied standing when the threat 
is made by a corporate affiliate of the patentee,214 or a non-
exclusive licensee,215 instead of the patentee itself. In Publica-
tions International, Ltd. v. Futech Educational Products, Inc., 
although the patentee’s Area Manager for Southeast Asia ex-
plicitly threatened an infringement suit if the new firm entered 
the market, the court held the threat insufficient because the 
manager was not an officer of the defendant and was not 
“qualified to render legal opinions regarding infringement.”216 
However, the manager was not rendering a legal opinion; in-
 
 209. Gamesa Eolica, S.A. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 1379, 1381 (W.D. 
Wis. 2004). 
 210. Citizen Elecs. Co. v. GMBH, 377 F. Supp. 2d 149, 154 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 211. See Royal Pet Inc. v. Edwards, Civ. No. 05-825 (DWF/SRN), 2005 WL 
2290826, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 20, 2005). 
 212. Studex Corp. v. Blomdahl Med. Innovation AB, 355 F. Supp. 2d 3, 8–9 
(D.D.C. 2004). 
 213. See Citizen, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
 214. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 653, 
659 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 215. See West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Res., 972 F.2d 1295, 1298 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In his dissent, Judge Lourie condemned the majority opinion 
as “simply permit[ting] a patentee to play games with the courts.” Id. at 1299 
(Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 216. No. 97 C 0236, 1997 WL 627641, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 1997). 
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stead, he was announcing the patentee’s intent and, thereby, 
creating a reasonable apprehension that the competitor would 
be sued. Others courts, too, have suggested that the fact that 
the alleged threat letter is not written by an attorney—but in-
stead by the firm’s Patent Manager—counsels against a finding 
of reasonable apprehension.217 Such holdings give patent-
holders a relatively easy way to threaten litigation and use 
their invalid patents to deter entry by competitors without cre-
ating standing for a declaratory judgment action. 
The case of Century Industries, Inc. v. Wenger Corp.218 of-
fers a clear example (albeit in a claim of noninfringement, 
rather than invalidity) of how aggressively a patentee can as-
sert patent rights in an attempt to deter a competitor’s market 
entry without creating a reasonable apprehension of suit that 
would entitle the competitor to declaratory resolution of the 
patent dispute. In Century Industries, the defendant-patentee 
sent a letter to the new competitor stating that the plaintiff ’s 
product “falls within the scope” of the defendant’s about-to-be-
reissued patent and that the defendant “will fully enforce its 
patent rights under the reissued patent.”219 At a trade show, 
the defendant’s delegation informed the plaintiff that the pat-
entee “had the money budgeted to pursue a legal resolution” of 
the patent dispute.220 The plaintiff spent November making its 
case for noninfringement to the patentee, to no avail.221 The 
plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action less than two 
months later, asking the court to declare that its product did 
not infringe the defendant’s patent.222 The court denied stand-
ing because the parties were “still engaged in discussions 
aimed at resolving the potential dispute,” the members of the 
defendant’s delegation did not have authority to speak for the 
defendant, and the plaintiff had waited too long after the trade 
show threat, such that any reasonable apprehension had 
passed.223 The court failed to appreciate how a reasonable com-
petitor would read the evidence. Whether the trade delegation 
 
 217. See Dataline, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., No. 00 CIV. 1578 
(LAP), 2001 WL 102336, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001). 
 218. 851 F. Supp. 1260 (S.D. Ind. 1994). 
 219. Id. at 1261–62. 
 220. Id. at 1262. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1264–65; see also infra notes 227–31 and accompanying text 
(discussing timing issues of declaratory judgment actions). 
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had the legal authority to bind the defendant is completely ir-
relevant; the delegation exposed the defendant’s activities in 
preparation for filing infringement litigation. If the statements 
“you’re infringing,” “we’ll enforce our patent,” and “we’ve budg-
eted the money for the lawsuit” do not create a reasonable ap-
prehension of litigation, what does? 
A patentee can engage in a range of other machinations to 
thwart declaratory judgment standing. For example, some case 
law suggests that if the patentee assigns its patent to someone 
else during litigation, the patent’s validity can evade scru-
tiny.224 Alternatively, the patentee can threaten its competitors’ 
customers instead of the competitors directly. Litigation 
threats to a new entrant’s customers may not qualify as creat-
ing a reasonable apprehension of suit, as courts have dismissed 
such evidence as mere hearsay.225 Courts taking this approach 
ignore the fact that the threat of an infringement suit is not be-
ing offered to prove that a lawsuit is forthcoming, but rather to 
show the effect of such threats on an entrant’s belief as to the 
likelihood of being sued.226 
A threatened competitor faces particular difficulty in mas-
tering the timing requirements that courts impose on declara-
tory judgment plaintiffs. On the one hand, judges have sug-
gested that potential infringers must wait and give patentees 
an opportunity to sue.227 On the other hand, courts have chas-
tised declaratory judgment plaintiffs for “inexplicably waiting 
to file suit for over six months after the last event that could 
reasonably have caused an apprehension of suit.”228 Even wait-
ing a mere two months after a qualifying threat is made can 
strip a threatened competitor of standing to pursue a declara-
tory judgment.229 The absence of an infringement suit between 
the threat and the filing of the declaratory judgment action can 
be dispositive. In one case, the defendant sent threatening let-
ters accusing the new competitor of infringing, offering a roy-
 
 224. See Figi Graphics, Inc. v. Estate of Edwards, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1364, 1368 
(D. Kan. 1997). 
 225. See West Interactive Corp. v. First Data Res., 972 F.2d 1295, 1300 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1048, 1053 (D. Kan. 1996) (rejecting standing, in part, because the competitor 
brought suit the day the patent was issued). 
 228. Citizen Elecs. Co. v. GMBH, 377 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 229. Century Indus., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (S.D. 
Ind. 1994). 
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alty-based license and stating that if the competitor did not ac-
cede quickly then the “favorable licensing terms . . . [would] no 
longer be available.”230 The court found no reasonable appre-
hension of suit because “[d]espite the arguably threatening tone 
of these letters, [the defendant] did nothing . . . .”231 The court 
seems to suggest that there was no declaratory judgment 
standing because the patentee did not actually sue. But that 
misses the whole point of the Declaratory Judgment Act: a 
threatened party does not have to wait to be sued. In sum, 
there is a window of reasonable apprehension such that new 
competitors can be denied standing if they wait too long or if 
they do not wait long enough, but courts have not defined the 
window with any precision. 
Finally, in those cases where the competitor can satisfy the 
technical requirements for standing to bring a declaratory judg-
ment action, judges still have the discretion to deny standing, 
and they often exercise that discretion against competitors.232 
In short, judges give insufficient consideration to the competi-
tors deterred from market entry by a dominant firm’s mainte-
nance of a potentially invalid patent which it refuses to dis-
avow. 
Even if the new competitor could establish standing, a col-
lective action problem might lead it to conclude that it is not in 
its best interests to pursue a declaratory judgment against the 
patent-holder. Collective action problems can occur when the 
members of a group would all be better off if they pursued a 
common course of action. If it is not cost-beneficial for an indi-
vidual to act alone because the costs of action exceed her indi-
vidual benefit—even though the overall social benefits exceed 
the overall social costs—then she takes no action despite the 
net social benefit. 
Declaratory judgment suits to invalidate suspect patents 
can present collective action problems. Competitors would all 
be better off if the invalid patent of a monopolist were invali-
dated. However, any new entrant who pursues a declaratory 
judgment action would bear the significant costs of bringing the 
lawsuit.233 This plaintiff alone bears these costs, but if it pre-
 
 230. Citizen, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
 231. Id. 
 232. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.32d 807, 813–15 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Dolak, supra note 200, at 913. 
 233. See Heerema Marine Contractors v. Sante Fe Int’1 Corp., 582 F. Supp. 
445, 449 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (“Although the availability of declaratory relief in 
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vails, then the benefits would be diffused throughout the mar-
ketplace. If one potential competitor sues to invalidate a patent 
and wins, then every other potential competitor can enter the 
market and the original plaintiff cannot recoup its litigation 
costs through exploiting the invention claimed in the invali-
dated patent.234 Thus, while challenging a suspect patent may 
be cost-beneficial for potential competitors as a group, it may 
not be cost-beneficial for any challenger acting on its own. 
Collective action problems are susceptible to solution when 
one member of the affected community has more at stake than 
the others. However, the holder of an invalid patent can pre-
vent this solution. If one company appears more likely to chal-
lenge the patent, the monopolist may buy off that firm with a 
settlement or royalty-free cross-licensing deal. Professor Tho-
mas has persuasively explained that where a potential com-
petitor has evidence of prior art that would invalidate a patent, 
the competitor can privately disclose the prior art reference to the 
patentee. So long as sufficient supracompetitive profits exist to go 
around, the patentee ordinarily possesses incentives to suppress the 
prior art by means of a favorable license. Both parties may then ex-
tract information rents from the consuming public by maintaining ar-
tificially high prices due to an invalid patent.235 
That new firm alone can enter the market, charge a supracom-
petitive price, and save the litigation costs. The monopolist also 
saves litigation costs and, more importantly, eliminates the 
risk (and perhaps certainty) that its patent will be invalidated. 
While the monopolist will have to share some of its monopoly 
profits with the new licensee, that is a better result than hav-
ing the patent exposed as invalid, because it can still maintain 
the patent as a head on the pike that may scare other firms 
away from the market. Additionally, if the terms of the license 
 
patent actions . . . often enables a potential infringer to avoid economically 
wasteful activity, this remedy does not allow him to avoid all potentially 
wasteful activity.”). 
In addition to filing fees and traditional litigation costs, attorneys’ fees 
would be an enormous out-of-pocket expense. Attorneys may not be willing to 
take a declaratory judgment case on contingency because there are no mean-
ingful damages from which to take a percentage. 
 234. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 20 (“Because the 
costs of a challenge are borne by the challenger, but the benefits of invalida-
tion spill over to other potential licensees and to consumers, the private incen-
tives to launch a challenge are less than would be warranted by the social re-
turn.”); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage 
Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 668 (2004). 
 235. Thomas, supra note 7, at 335. 
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are not publicized, the fact that the earlier firm acquired a li-
cense to the patent might provide a patina of legitimacy to the 
patent. 
Independent of the collective action problem, competitors 
may face great costs in initiating a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. Litigation costs pose a barrier to entry. The fact that the 
end result of litigation may be the invalidation of the patent ig-
nores the huge transactions costs and delay, which themselves 
constitute barriers to entry. Indeed, even if the new entrant 
foresees a positive litigation result, the transactions costs and 
the delay alone may convince the firm that the game is not 
worth the candle. 
3. Public Use Proceedings 
In theory, interested third parties can prevent the issuance 
of invalid patents by participating in public use proceedings. 
The public use proceeding allows members of the public to 
submit evidence to the PTO in order to show the public use or 
sale of a claimed invention more than a year before the applica-
tion was filed.236 Public use proceedings are largely ineffective, 
however, because the PTO does not publish pending patent ap-
plications until eighteen months after those applications are 
filed—giving the public little time to research and report any 
previous public use or sale of the claimed invention.237 As Pro-
fessor Janis notes, “public use proceedings can only be initiated 
in those rare instances in which the applicant divulges infor-
mation about a pending application. Thus, public use proceed-
ings have been exceedingly rare and could not conceivably func-
tion as a systemic curative mechanism.”238 While there is little 
downside to allowing public use proceedings for those instances 
when a competitor or other interested party has relevant evi-
dence to present and knows of the pending application in order 
to present the evidence in a timely manner, this mechanism 
cannot effectively screen out the bulk of invalid patents. 
 
 236. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (2006); Russell E. Levine et al., Ex Parte Patent 
Practice and the Rights of Third Parties, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1987, 2006–07 
(1996). 
 237. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000). But see Thomas, supra note 7, at 330–31 
(arguing that competitors may still intuit the contents of domestic patent ap-
plications by examining foreign applications). 
 238. Janis, supra note 97, at 16. 
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4. Opposition Proceedings 
Some commentators have advocated the creation of post-
grant opposition proceedings, modeled on those conducted by 
the European Patent Office.239 Opposition proceedings would 
provide a mechanism for competitors to challenge a suspect 
patent. This would represent a significant improvement over 
the current system of reexamination. But post-grant opposition 
proceedings would not compensate excluded competitors for the 
injuries caused by the knowing maintenance of an invalid pat-
ent; they only seek to prevent future harm. Because there are 
no damages available, if opposition proceedings were the sole 
mechanism for invalidating bad patents, they would not pro-
vide sufficient incentive for monopolists with invalid patents to 
disclaim their patent rights before that invalidity is discovered 
by others. Another problem with opposition proceedings is that 
they are generally structured as one-shot opportunities. If com-
petitors discover prior art or other reasons to question patent 
validity after termination of the opposition proceedings, they 
are left with litigation as the only means to invalidate the pat-
ent.240 For all of these reasons, post-grant opposition proceed-
ings ultimately would not provide sufficient deterrence against 
patent fraud. 
5. Summary 
In sum, patent law does not currently provide a cost-
effective way to challenge invalid patents and to deter a mo-
nopolist’s knowing maintenance of an invalid patent as a bar-
rier to entry. Several mechanisms within the patent system fail 
to achieve their goal of effectively weeding out invalid patents. 
Patent law, therefore, does not deter patent fraud and the 
maintenance of invalid patents because the potential benefits 
are high and the potential costs are relatively low. The benefits 
include potential monopoly profits for the life of the patent; in 
 
 239. See id. at 99–107; Merges, supra note 10, at 589; Thomas, supra note 
7, at 307. Opposition proceedings also were proposed in the Patent Reform Act 
of 2005. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. §§ 321–340 (2005). 
 240. If the proceedings were structured so that another opportunity for 
challenge was provided for newly discovered prior art, as proposed in the Pat-
ent Reform Act of 2005, this could solve the problem. See H.R. 2795, 
§ 321(a)(1)–(2) (requiring that “for each opposition request submitted . . . the 
Director shall determine . . . [if] a substantial question of patentability exists” 
and if so “the Director shall commence an opposition proceeding” (emphasis 
added)). 
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contrast, the costs include the patent acquisition fees and the 
penalties if caught, discounted by the probability of getting 
caught. Deterrence is a function of detection and punishment, 
yet the risk of detection is low because invalidity is hard to de-
tect241 and evidentiary standards significantly favor the patent-
holder.242 The collective action dynamics exacerbate the diffi-
culty of exposing invalid patents. As a result, patent law ulti-
mately fails to deter fraud against the PTO and the mainte-
nance of invalid patents to secure market power. 
B. ANTITRUST LAW DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY DETER FRAUD 
AGAINST THE PTO AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INVALID PATENTS. 
Antitrust law is also not up to the task of deterring and 
punishing fraud against the Patent Office. In theory, “a Walker 
Process claim is designed to prohibit a dominant party from 
willfully and fraudulently monopolizing a market by deterring 
another company’s attempt to enter that market.”243 But anti-
trust law does not adequately deter the commission of fraud 
against the PTO. The same difficulties that weaken patent 
law’s ability to weed out invalid patents plague antitrust law 
because courts use the standard for declaratory judgment 
standing, described above, to determine whether the patentee 
has engaged in “enforcement” sufficient to establish a Walker 
Process claim.244 The Federal Circuit recently held that “as a 
matter of Federal Circuit antitrust law, the standards . . . for 
determining jurisdiction in a Declaratory Judgment Action of 
patent invalidity also define the minimum level of ‘enforcement’ 
necessary to expose the patentee to a Walker Process claim for 
attempted monopolization.”245 Courts treat the failure to satisfy 
the declaratory judgment standard as dispositive of the en-
forcement requirement in Walker Process cases.246 
The enforcement requirement makes maintenance of an 
invalid patent cost-beneficial. Under the current legal regime, 
 
 241. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text. 
 243. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pre-
gerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 244. See Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, S.A., 861 F. Supp. 
653, 660 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
 245. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006). 
 246. See, e.g., K-Lath, Inc. v. Davis Wire Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964 
(C.D. Cal. 1998). 
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the holder of an invalid patent can secure monopoly rents for 
years without ever worrying about antitrust liability. If know-
ingly maintaining an invalid patent cannot itself give rise to le-
gal liability, then it is perfectly rational for a monopolist to sit 
tight—neither initiating infringement litigation nor informing 
the market of the patent’s invalidity. Once a patentee learns 
that its patent is invalid, it costs little, if anything, to remain 
silent.247 As a result, maintaining an invalid patent can provide 
a relatively cost-effective mechanism to deter others from en-
tering one’s market. If a potential competitor sees that a mo-
nopolist has a patent and the new entrant has no basis for 
thinking that the patent is invalid, that patent alone will keep 
the new entrant from entering the market.248 Even if the rival 
suspects or strongly believes the patent to be invalid, it may ra-
tionally decide to decline to compete if it cannot do so without 
infringing.249 The current antitrust rule creates an incentive for 
firms to acquire and maintain invalid patents and then to bide 
their time, since the mere presence of the patent should be 
enough to deter many potential competitors. 
The enforcement requirement creates an effective safe har-
bor for firms that commit fraud against the PTO: So long as you 
do not threaten to sue anyone, you cannot be held liable under 
antitrust laws. There is not a sufficient reason to avoid commit-
ting fraud on the PTO. The mere possession of the patent can 
sufficiently suppress effective competition in the markets (a 
benefit to the patentee) and does not create the risk of mone-
tary penalties (thus, imposing no costs on the patentee). But if 
the mere possession of an invalid patent is enough to maintain 
monopoly power, then antitrust law should address that pos-
session even in the absence of any active enforcement efforts. 
IV.  PROVING ANTITRUST LIABILITY BASED ON 
MAINTENANCE OF INVALID PATENTS   
Neither antitrust nor patent law should operate in a man-
ner that makes fraud on the PTO cost-beneficial. Both bodies of 
law should facilitate the elimination of competition-reducing 
invalid patents from the marketplace. Section Two of the 
Sherman Act offers two causes of action that should constrain a 
monopolist’s acquisition and knowing possession of an invalid 
 
 247. The only obvious cost is the payment of maintenance fees. 
 248. See supra notes 132–42 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 143–70 and accompanying text. 
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patent: monopolization and attempted monopolization.250 This 
section proposes an expansion of the Walker Process doctrine by 
eliminating the enforcement requirement, suggests what the 
elements of the antitrust cause of action should be, and ex-
plains why such an expansion of antitrust jurisprudence is 
warranted. 
A. MAINTENANCE OF AN INVALID PATENT AS ILLEGAL 
MONOPOLIZATION 
In United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Supreme Court es-
tablished a two-pronged test for illegal monopolization.251 The 
plaintiff must show “(1) the [defendant’s] possession of monop-
oly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.”252 Additionally, a private plaintiff 
must show that it suffered causal antitrust injury.253 This sec-
tion argues that a monopolist’s knowing possession of an inva-
lid patent can satisfy these elements. 
1. Monopoly Power in a Relevant Market 
As with any monopolization claim, a plaintiff must first de-
fine the relevant product and geographic markets and then 
prove that the defendant possesses monopoly power in this 
properly defined market.254 The mere possession of a patent, 
valid or invalid, does not necessarily confer any market power, 
let alone monopoly power, on the patent-holder.255 If the invalid 
patent confers no monopoly power on the patentee, then Sec-
tion Two takes no issue with how the patentee acquired the 
patent or what it does with it.256 However, if the patent-holder 
possesses monopoly power, then Section Two is implicated.257 
 
 250. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 251. 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See infra notes 295–307 and accompanying text. 
 254. See infra notes 295–307 and accompanying text. 
 255. See Merges, supra note 10, at 603 (“[M]ost [patented] technologies will 
not be economically viable or commercially successful . . . .”). 
 256. Section Two also condemns conspiracies to monopolize, but relatively 
little Section Two case law addresses the cause of action; nor will this Article. 
 257. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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2. Monopoly Conduct: Knowingly Maintaining an  
Invalid Patent 
The possession of monopoly power does not itself pose prob-
lems for a patent-holder. Not all monopolies are illegal; it is not 
unlawful for a firm to possess a monopoly that has been thrust 
upon it.258 However, as the Court noted in the second element 
of the Grinnell test, a monopolist who acquires or maintains its 
market power through anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct 
violates the antitrust laws.259 A practice is exclusionary if it 
“‘tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, [based on some-
thing other than] competition on the merits.’”260 
A monopolist’s knowing maintenance of invalid patents 
impairs rivals’ opportunities to compete on the merits by im-
posing unnecessary barriers to entry in a number of related 
ways.261 First, maintaining an invalid patent is direct exclu-
sionary conduct because the purpose of patents is to exclude ri-
vals from markets. Invalid patents can exclude competitors just 
as effectively as valid patents. When the invalid patent—and 
the attendant fear of infringement litigation—succeeds in de-
terring entry, the monopolist has erected an effective (and ille-
gal) barrier to entry. A monopolist’s creation of barriers to en-
try, absent legitimate business justification, is anticompetitive 
conduct.262 
Second, a monopolist’s knowing maintenance of an invalid 
patent raises costs for those rivals who seek to enter the mar-
ket despite the presence of a powerful patent. Raising rivals’ 
costs can constitute exclusionary conduct sufficient to satisfy 
the second prong of Grinnell.263 When a monopolist possesses a 
 
 258. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 
1945) (dealing with an incidental monopoly regarding aluminum). 
 259. United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 260. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
n.32 (1985) (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 
78 (1978)). 
 261. This section discusses invalidity at the patent level, but in reality it is 
the individual claims within a patent that may be invalid. A patent can have 
some valid claims and some invalid claims. For the purposes of this Article, I 
am referring to situations where a monopolist knows that one or more of its 
claims is invalid and that it is the invalid claim(s) that deter competitors from 
entering the market. 
 262. See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191–92 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
 263. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Ex-
clusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 
230–49 (1986). 
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patent that it knows to be invalid, the entry costs of competi-
tors increase in many ways. The monopolist has increased 
search and investigation costs of those competitors who take 
the route of trying to invalidate the suspect patent. The most 
frequent mechanism to invalidate a bad patent is the presenta-
tion of prior art or a barring event.264 But this usually requires 
the would-be competitor to research and find the prior art that 
invalidates a patent.265 If the patent-holder-monopolist already 
knew about this prior art and withheld it, the competitor’s 
search represents a waste of societal resources—assuming that 
the competitor can even find the invalidating prior art. As for 
those competitors that attempt to enter the market without in-
fringing the patent, the monopolist has increased the research 
and development costs that they must incur to invent around 
the invalid patent.266 If the monopolist had a duty to disavow 
the patent that it knows to be invalid, then the new entrant 
could save all of these the costs. 
Many potential strategies that a monopolist might use to 
raise rivals’ costs are discounted by commentators as impracti-
cal because, in order to implement the strategy, the monopolist 
would incur costs greater than or equal to the expenses that the 
target competitor faces.267 Maintaining an invalid patent as a 
strategy to raise rivals’ costs does not suffer this disadvantage. 
Rather, it allows the monopolist to impose significant costs on 
any would-be entrant without the monopolist itself actually in-
curring any serious costs beyond relatively small maintenance 
fees.268 While maintaining an invalid patent is cheap, the costs 
incurred by competitors are, in contrast, relatively high. 
Finally, it bears stating the obvious: maintaining monopoly 
power through the knowing possession of invalid patents is not 
competition on the merits. Knowingly holding on to invalid pat-
ents cannot be characterized as “growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
 
 264. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 3, at 207–08. 
 265. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 267. Chicago School theorists often discount exclusionary conduct because 
it can cost the monopolist as much as, if not more than, the targeted firm. See, 
e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
149–52 (2d ed. 1993). 
 268. Maintenance fees are negligible compared to the potential monopoly 
profits than can be earned by deterring legitimate entry. See supra notes 243–
49 and accompanying text. 
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accident.”269 The monopolist in this scenario has the ability to 
exclude competition for reasons completely unrelated to effi-
ciency. There is no legitimate reason for misrepresenting the 
validity of an invalid patent. The possession of an invalid pat-
ent constitutes illegal exclusionary conduct.270 
An antitrust plaintiff can establish the second element of 
the Grinnell test either by explaining why the defendant’s chal-
lenged conduct is exclusionary or by employing a multi-prong 
test for specific conduct that courts have held can satisfy Grin-
nell’s second element. Taking this second approach, a monopo-
lization claim based specifically on a monopolist’s knowing 
maintenance of an invalid patent should require the plaintiff to 
prove a number of individual elements in order to establish 
that the defendant has indeed engaged in monopoly conduct. 
a. Patent Invalidity 
First, the antitrust plaintiff must prove that the monopo-
list’s patent is, in fact, invalid. Walker Process requires this al-
ready.271 So, proof of this element can be established using the 
current legal test, which starts with a presumption of patent 
validity and requires that the challenger prove invalidity by 
clear and convincing evidence.272 
b. Intent: The Monopolist Knew Its Patent Was Invalid. 
Section Two monopolization does not impose a traditional 
intent requirement. The confusing role of intent in antitrust ju-
risprudence stems in large part from Judge Learned Hand’s 
statement in Alcoa that “no monopolist monopolizes uncon-
scious of what he is doing.”273 But Section Two also is not a 
 
 269. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
 270. See Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 522 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (“[I]f the conduct has no rational business purpose other than its 
adverse effects on competitors, an inference that it is exclusionary is sup-
ported.”). 
 271. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 
U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (finding that the requirements of a monopolization cause 
of action can be met if the patentee obtained a patent by fraud on the PTO or 
“maintains and enforces the patent with knowledge of the patent’s infirmity”). 
 272. See Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (D. Colo. 
1998) (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1467 
(Fed. Cir. 1990)), aff ’d sub nom. Baxa Corp. v. Excelsior Med. Corp., 185 F.3d 
883 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 273. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
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strict liability offense. Mere possession of monopoly power is 
not a violation; only willful acquisition or maintenance of mo-
nopoly power through anticompetitive conduct violates Section 
Two.274 The Grinnell Court’s use of the word “willful” suggests 
some level of intent. The proposed requirement that the patent-
holder know that its patent is invalid satisfies the need for es-
tablishing intent as a prerequisite for Section Two liability. 
To protect patentees against inappropriate liability, courts 
require the plaintiff to prove that the monopolist knew that its 
patent was invalid. The patentee can know its patent is invalid 
either before or after it issues. If the patentee committed fraud 
against the PTO, there is no problem with determining that the 
firm “knows” that its patent is invalid. In evaluating Walker 
Process and Handgards claims, courts must already determine 
whether a patentee knew of a patent’s invalidity.275 As the gov-
ernment noted in its amicus brief in support of the petitioner in 
Walker Process, “[t]he fact that an applicant has deliberately 
misled a governmental office into granting an undeserved pat-
ent under color of which others may be excluded from the mar-
ket is conclusive evidence of an intention to achieve unlawful 
monopoly power.”276 Food Machinery Company (FMC) swore in 
its oath to the PTO that it knew of no public use occurring more 
than one year before it filed its application, but FMC had itself 
used its invention before the critical date.277 Thus, there was no 
 
 274. See Grinell, 384 U.S. at 570–71 (noting that Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act requires “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power” 
(emphasis added)). 
 275. Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1386 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The Handgards decisions explicitly state that to prevail in 
an antitrust claim based upon enforcement of an invalid or unenforceable pat-
ent, the litigant must establish that the patentee acted in bad faith in enforc-
ing the patent because he knew that the patent was invalid.”); Baxa, 996 F. 
Supp. at 1049 (“To prevail, however, an antitrust plaintiff ‘must establish that 
the patentee acted in bad faith in enforcing the patent because he knew that 
the patent was invalid.’” (quoting Argus, 812 F.3d at 1386)). 
 276. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 83, at 14, 
reprinted in ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 738; 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Walker Process, 382 U.S. 172 (No. 13), re-
printed in ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 754 (oral 
argument of Daniel M. Friedman, on behalf of the United States as amicus cu-
riae, stating “[w]e think the essential element of this case is the knowing as-
pect of it, because [FMC] intentionally obtained this power by knowingly mis-
representing the facts to the Patent Office.”). 
 277. CHISUM, supra note 14, § 19.03[1][f], at 19-158; see also Walker Proc-
ess, 382 U.S. at 177 (“Walker’s counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery ob-
tained the patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Pat-
ent Office.” (emphasis added)). 
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doubt about FMC’s knowledge of invalidity. When a patent ap-
plication includes deceptive affidavits, it is not difficult to di-
vine the patentee’s state of knowledge.278 
Alternatively, the patentee can learn of the invalidity after 
the patent issues (or after it acquires the patent from another 
firm). Because the standard proposed here is actual knowledge 
of patent invalidity, the test is straightforward to apply and it 
is already performed in Handgards-type cases. In Handgards 
itself, the patentee knew its patent was invalid, as the jury 
found in response to special interrogatories.279 
It does not matter why one’s patent is invalid, whether be-
cause of fraud committed by the current patent-holder or be-
cause it discovers the patent invalidity after it acquires the pat-
ent (either from the PTO or the previous owner of the patent). 
If a patentee knows that its patent is invalid and yet it holds it 
out to the world as a valid patent, it has distorted the market-
place in an anticompetitive manner. Potential competitors are 
not deterred because the patent-holder is more efficient or has 
a legal right to exclude competitors; rather, they are deciding 
not to compete because the patent-holder is lying to them, 
claiming it has a right that it knows it does not have. This is 
not competition on the merits. A monopolist who maintains its 
 
 278. See, e.g., Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc. 984 F.2d 
1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that the submission of deceptive affidavits 
to the PTO strongly supports an inference of an intent to deceive the PTO); 
Herman v. William Brooks Shoe Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1773, 1777 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (“The Federal Circuit has held that [a deceptive affidavit creates] . . . an 
inference of intent, justifying grant of summary judgment, . . . based on ‘the 
affirmative acts of submitting [the affidavits], their misleading character, and 
the inability of the examiner to investigate the facts.’” (quoting Paragon Po-
diatry, 984 F.2d at 1191)), rev’d, 111 F.3d 142 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding sum-
mary judgment improper because a genuine issue of material fact still re-
mained, even though submission of a false affidavit is per se material); see also 
F.B. Leopold Co. v. Roberts Filter Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1375, 1381–82 
(W.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that the applicant’s “intent is clearly demonstrated 
. . . [by] his conscious effort to conceal [a patent-disqualifying transaction] 
from his newly hired attorney” and by firing his “patent attorney of 10 years 
. . . after receiving an unfavorable patentability opinion”), aff ’d, 119 F.3d 15 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 279. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1979); see 
also Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“Noting that [in Handgards] the defendant presented evidence that 
the patentee ‘actually knew’ that the patent was invalid ‘on one or more of 
three separate grounds,’ the court concluded that substantial evidence sup-
ported a jury finding that the patentee ‘prosecuted its patent suit in bad 
faith.’” (quoting Handgards, 743 F.2d at 1288)). 
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dominant position by knowingly possessing an invalid patent is 
engaging in quintessential exclusionary conduct. 
An intent requirement is particularly important for the an-
titrust cause of action proposed here. Antitrust law should not 
punish the negligence or inadvertent maintenance of a patent 
that turns out to be invalid.280 Of course, the same anticompeti-
tive effects can come from an invalid patent whether or not the 
patentee knows of the patent’s invalidity. This would be an ar-
gument for treating the holding of an invalid patent as the ba-
sis for antitrust liability regardless of whether the patentee 
knew or had reason to know that its patent was, in fact, inva-
lid. But absent a knowledge requirement, there is a serious risk 
of courts imposing treble damages on patent-holders for good-
faith maintenance of patents that are ultimately held invalid. A 
good faith belief of a patent’s validity should protect the pat-
entee from liability for antitrust violations, even if that patent 
is later proven to be invalid. 281 
Even with this knowledge requirement, there is a risk that 
a competitor could call the monopolist’s attention to vague ref-
erences to potential prior art and then assert that the monopo-
list “knew” its patent was invalid. Thus, there is the potential 
for costly harassment if patentees felt obligated to chase down 
all such rumors lest they violate the antitrust laws. This Article 
does not propose the creation of an independent duty to inves-
tigate mere accusations or suspicions of patent invalidity.282 
The standard for intent proposed here is not that the monopo-
list should have known; it is actual knowledge. Vague insinua-
tions of invalidity do not create actual knowledge. A standard is 
needed that prevents abusive tactics when a competitor “in-
forms” the patentee that its patent is invalid. 
While line-drawing is difficult in the abstract, one possible 
standard would be that any such notice must be sufficient to 
survive a motion for summary judgment. A defendant monopo-
list would be found to possess actual knowledge of a patent’s 
invalidity if that defendant monopolist were (1) specifically in-
 
 280. For example, while patent invalidity is a common defense asserted in 
patent infringement suits, the success of the defense should not automatically 
create antitrust liability (even if the patent-holder was a monopolist). 
 281. See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177 (“By the same token, Food Ma-
chinery’s good faith would furnish a complete defense. This includes an honest 
mistake as to the effect of prior installation upon patentability—so-called 
‘technical fraud.’”). 
 282. Such a duty could provide a marginal disincentive to legitimate pat-
enting activity, a result this proposal seeks strenuously to avoid. 
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formed of the basis of a patent’s invalidity and (2) provided 
with all the evidence necessary to support such a basis of inva-
lidity. However, if the proffered prior art merely created a rea-
sonable argument of invalidity, then actual knowledge would 
not be established. 
The intent requirement provides a balance between the 
competing goals of exposing invalid patents and preserving suf-
ficient incentives to innovate. Antitrust law could eliminate 
more competition-reducing invalid patents if it punished any 
monopolist who maintained market power through an invalid 
patent, regardless of the monopolist’s awareness of invalidity. 
While this would lead to the exposure of more invalid patents 
(and eliminate the necessity of determining the defendant’s 
state of knowledge), such an approach would impose too great a 
burden on the patent system. If patent-holders had to worry 
that any subsequent finding of invalidity of their most valuable 
patents could also give rise to liability for treble damages, they 
would have a disincentive to engage in patentable activity. 
So long as the patentee either does not know its patent is 
invalid or has a good faith belief that its patent is valid, then 
the patentee does not have the requisite level of intent.283 Anti-
trust liability would not attach under the cause of action pro-
posed here. 
c. Duty to Disavow Invalid Patents 
This Article argues in favor of creating a duty for monopo-
lists to disavow patents that they know to be invalid and that 
are used to maintain their monopoly power. To win any claim 
based on this duty, an antitrust plaintiff would have to show 
that the monopolist failed to disavow the patent’s validity. Con-
versely, if a monopolist could show that it dedicated its patent 
to the public domain—or otherwise disavowed an intent to en-
force its patent in a way that legally absolved potential infring-
ers of liability—within a set time period (say, six months) of 
discovering that its patent was invalid, this showing should 
constitute a defense to antitrust liability based on the invalid 
patent. This creates an incentive for firms to take appropriate 
action when they learn that a particular patent in their portfo-
lio is invalid. 
 
 283. See CHISUM, supra note 14, § 19.03[4], at 19-262 (“A good faith mis-
take does not constitute fraud or inequitable conduct.”). 
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Patent law provides that a patentee (or patent applicant) 
can disclaim its patent or dedicate it to the public domain.284 
Firms need not say why they are dedicating their patent to the 
public domain. No doubt, public relations departments will spin 
any dedication as a magnanimous act by a corporation trying to 
serve the common good, even at the expense of profits. Linux 
and other players in the open source movement have made self-
less business decisions less suspicious. 
To satisfy the duty to disavow an invalid patent, the mo-
nopolist’s act must meet two criteria. First, any statement of 
intent not to enforce a patent must be legally binding. If it were 
not legally binding, then potential competitors could still be de-
terred from entering the market by a rational fear of being sued 
for infringement. Second, any statement of intent not to enforce 
should be irrevocable. Once a patent is in the public domain, it 
remains there permanently, whether the patent arrives in the 
public domain through expiration of the patent or by dedication 
of the patentee. If a decision not to enforce one’s patent were 
subject to revocation, the patentee could announce such a deci-
sion and then wait to see whether the patented technology was 
widely adopted. If so, after creation of path dependence it 
would be more—and perhaps prohibitively—costly for consum-
ers to shift to another standard. The patentee could exact mo-
nopoly profits for the life of the patent or until another domi-
nant standard, not covered by the patent, emerged. 
The PTO should maintain an accurate, up-to-date list of 
dedicated or invalidated patents.285 Firms should be able to de-
termine whether a patent has entered the public domain with 
the same ease as determining whether a patent has been is-
sued governing a particular invention or process. A monopo-
list’s decision to add its patent to the list would deprive the 
patent owner of the ability to sue for infringement. Patents on 
the list would be strictly unenforceable and would be treated 
like an expired patent. If a firm with monopoly power, main-
taining that power through a patent that it knows to be invalid, 
does not surrender its invalid patent, then these facts could 
suffice to establish that the firm failed its duty to disavow. 
Some may argue that a duty to disavow invalid patents is 
too burdensome. But the duty exists only if the patent-holder 
 
 284. See 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2000). 
 285. The patents listed in the current PTO database should contain an an-
notation that informs researchers whether a patent has been judicially invali-
dated, or disavowed or otherwise abandoned by the patent-holder. 
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knows that its patent is, in fact, invalid. Negligently holding an 
invalid patent in one’s patent portfolio, oblivious to its invalid-
ity, should not violate antitrust laws. Furthermore, the duty 
only applies to monopolists.286 The duty to disclose an invalid 
patent is substantially less intrusive than the other duties that 
antitrust law imposes on monopolists, such as sharing essential 
facilities and continuing certain business arrangements.287 This 
duty requires no meaningful expenditures or the continuation 
of unwanted business relationships. It is not an ongoing duty; 
once the monopolist disavows its patent, the duty is done. 
The duty is reasonable because patentees already have a 
duty of candor to disclose material information during the pat-
ent application process. Patent applicants have a duty to report 
all material facts to the PTO,288 and, in some instances, current 
law already punishes a patent-holder for failing to disclose that 
it has a patent or has applied for one. For example, in the con-
text of proceedings to adopt industry standards, some courts 
require the patent-holder to inform its standard-setting board 
co-members that it possesses, or has applied for, a patent that 
would be infringed by a proposed industry standard.289 In addi-
tion, the proposed duty is not without existing analogies else-
where; the law already allows the suppression of accurate in-
formation to serve as the basis for legal liability in many other 
contexts. For instance, suppressing information can constitute 
securities fraud, and tort law punishes drug companies that 
suppress negative information about their products. Thus, it is 
not revolutionary to hold patent-holders accountable for sup-
pressing the known truth about their patent’s invalidity. 
The reasonableness of a duty to disavow invalid patents 
can also be seen by considering the duty, in other contexts, to 
 
 286. The duty might also apply to those firms with a dangerous probability 
of monopolizing a relevant market and with a specific intent to monopolize 
that market, in the case of attempted monopolization claims. 
 287. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
585–86, 611 (1985). 
 288. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 818 (1945) (“Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office 
or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty 
to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying 
the applications in issue.”). 
 289. James C. De Vellis, Patenting Industry Standards: Balancing the 
Rights of Patent Holders with the Need for Industry-Wide Standards, 31 
AIPLA Q.J. 301, 332–33 (2003) (quoting Stambler v. Diebold, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1709, 1714 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)) (citing Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1993)). 
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return government property. The government grant of a patent 
confers a property right upon the patentee. A firm that know-
ingly possesses a property right to which it is not entitled has 
an obligation to return it. The government has a long-standing 
right to recover funds that have been erroneously granted to a 
private party.290 In particular, the government can recover tax 
refunds that are erroneously given to a taxpayer.291 Courts 
should treat intellectual property no differently. Indeed, a 
stronger argument can be made with respect to intellectual 
property since, unlike an unearned tax refund, ownership of in-
tellectual property rights gives the holder rights against third 
parties. When the government gives a taxpayer too large a tax 
refund, third parties remain largely unaffected.292 But if the 
government grants an unearned patent right to a firm, then po-
tential competitors may be deterred from entry, and consumers 
may pay a higher price for products. In sum, whether the pat-
entee has committed fraud or not, the patent-holder who know-
ingly maintains an invalid patent is retaining property rights 
that the government has erroneously granted and that the pat-
entee has no right to keep—let alone deploy against third par-
ties. 
Of course, the monopolist must be afforded some opportu-
nity to consider its position and to disavow its patent. A defined 
grace period should be established. The grace period must be 
 
 290. United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415 (1938) (“The Government by 
appropriate action can recover funds which its agents have wrongfully, erro-
neously, or illegally paid. ‘No statute is necessary to authorize the United 
States to sue in such a case. The right to sue is independent of statute.’” (quot-
ing United States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 40 U.S. 377, 401 (1841))). 
 291. 26 U.S.C. § 6532(b) (2000) (“Recovery [by the United States] of an er-
roneous refund by suit under section 7405 shall be allowed only if such suit is 
begun within 2 years after the making of such refund, except that such suit 
may be brought at any time within 5 years from the making of the refund if it 
appears that any part of the refund was induced by fraud or misrepresentation 
of a material fact.”). See, e.g., Mildred Cotler Trust v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 
2d 264, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 184 F.3d 168 (2d. Cir. 
1999). 
Indeed, the government can recover interest on the refund that it mistak-
enly awarded even when the taxpayer has done nothing wrong and has noti-
fied the IRS about the erroneous refund. See, e.g., Brookhurst, Inc. v. United 
States, 931 F.2d 554, 557–58 (9th Cir. 1991). In some instances, the federal 
government can recover fines, as well as treble damages, when an individual 
conceals its obligation to transmit money or property to the government. See, 
e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2000); United States v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 195 
F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 292. There may be a slight drain on government coffers that has a mini-
mal, indirect effect on many people. 
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long enough to allow the patentee to make an informed decision 
but not so long as to allow the monopolist to profit unreasona-
bly from extending the delay in market entry by competitors. 
Anywhere in the range of three to six months would be a rea-
sonable amount of time. Not all monopolists that knowingly 
possess invalid patents should receive the benefit of a grace pe-
riod, though. If the patentee-monopolist actually commits fraud 
against the PTO in obtaining its patent, then it has violated 
Section Two as soon as it either achieves monopoly power or 
has a dangerous probability of doing so. However, if the mo-
nopolist only discovers that its patent is invalid after the patent 
has been issued, it should be entitled to a grace period. 
d. Affirmative Defense: Legitimate Business Justification 
Courts generally allow Section Two defendants to argue 
that their exclusionary conduct is supported by a legitimate 
business justification. The defendant bears the initial burden of 
showing that its challenged conduct was intended to further a 
legitimate business justification.293 If it can establish such a 
justification, the plaintiff must show that the justification is 
pretextual or that the goal could be achieved through less re-
strictive means.294 This defense is unlikely to be an issue in 
this new cause of action: there is simply no legitimate justifica-
tion for knowingly maintaining an invalid patent. 
3. Causal Antitrust Injury 
Finally, a private antitrust plaintiff must prove causal an-
titrust injury in order to recover damages. This requires two re-
lated showings by the plaintiff: first, that it suffered an anti-
trust injury, and second, that the defendant’s conduct caused 
that injury. “Antitrust injury” refers to injuries of the type that 
antitrust law was designed to prevent, such as the exclusion of 
efficient competitors or an increase in price to consumers. A 
monopolist’s maintenance of an invalid patent can create anti-
trust injury. Perhaps the injury is most clear when a monopo-
list—who knows its patent is invalid—convinces rivals to take 
out licenses. The licensees suffer antitrust injury which can be 
measured by the unnecessary royalty payments. Competition 
 
 293. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 294. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 81 
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Clorox Co. v. Sterline Wintrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 
(2d. Cir. 1997)), aff ’d, 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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also is reduced when an invalid patent causes would-be com-
petitors to decline to enter the market. A firm deterred from 
entering a market because of an invalid patent has suffered an-
titrust injury: its reduced potential profits are the result of di-
minished competition, not sales lost to a more efficient competi-
tor.295 Consumers, too, suffer antitrust injury in such a 
situation, as they do whenever a monopolist acquires or main-
tains its monopoly through anticompetitive conduct.296 
In order to establish causation, an antitrust plaintiff may 
not simply show that a monopolist knowingly possessed an in-
valid patent. A private plaintiff pursuing a Section Two cause 
of action also must prove that the defendant’s antitrust viola-
tion caused its harm; namely, that the presence of the invalid 
patent297 caused the plaintiff either to exit the market or to de-
cline entry into a market that it was otherwise ready, willing, 
and able to enter within a reasonable time.298 Thus, the plain-
tiff competitor claiming that it has suffered antitrust injury be-
cause of the defendant monopolist’s knowing maintenance of an 
invalid patent must prove three separate components in order 
to establish the causal antitrust injury element: (1) it desired to 
enter the relevant market, (2) it had the ability to enter the 
market, and (3) the defendant’s invalid patent was a but-for 
cause in the decision not to enter the market.299 If the antitrust 
 
 295. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 482 
(1977). 
 296. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 3, at 40–41 (“According to 
Professor Shapiro, the higher royalty paid by companies subject to a hold-up 
strategy may result in higher prices to consumers, inefficiently low use of the 
affected products, and deadweight loss.”). 
I am not here advocating for granting consumers standing to assert 
Walker Process claims, something that they currently cannot do. In re Cipro-
floxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). That is a topic for another day. 
 297. Of course, the plaintiff does not have to establish that it knew the pat-
ent to be invalid. Even if a plaintiff firm suspected or knew the patent to be 
invalid but feared an infringement suit and thus declined market entry, that 
should be sufficient. The critical issue is the defendant’s awareness of the pat-
ent’s invalidity, not the plaintiff ’s. 
 298. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (citing Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 
(Fed.Cir.1985)). 
 299. This is similar to the second prong of the test for declaratory judgment 
standing to challenge patent validity, which requires that the plaintiff “must 
have actually produced or prepared to produce an allegedly infringing prod-
uct.” Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1991), 
abrogated on other grounds by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, 508 U.S. 83 
(1993). 
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plaintiff entered the market after a meaningful delay despite 
the suspect patent, or limited its sales—either geographically 
or in volume—out of fear of drawing a patent infringement suit, 
it has similarly suffered antitrust injury, and the same causa-
tion test applies. 
Desire to Enter the Relevant Market: A plaintiff cannot 
show that it suffered antitrust injury from the defendant’s con-
duct unless it can establish that it was planning to enter the 
relevant market.300 Courts should be leery of firms bringing 
frivolous claims whenever a monopolist’s patent is found to be 
invalid. While the need to prove that the monopolist knew its 
patent was invalid provides one meaningful filter against false 
positives, courts can also screen out suspect suits brought by 
professional plaintiffs by requiring meaningful evidence that 
the plaintiff was, in fact, planning to enter the market while 
the monopolist possessed the patent. The strongest evidence of 
a desire to enter the market would be contemporaneous corre-
spondence, e-mails, memoranda, and reports that document the 
firm’s decision to enter the relevant market. Although clearly 
relevant and perhaps sufficient in some cases, testimony from 
the plaintiff ’s executives and employees would be less persua-
sive. Defendants could challenge the veracity of such proclama-
tions since firms could easily assert a prior interest in entering 
a monopolized market. In any case, even if the plaintiff ’s testi-
mony is self-serving, such testimony only demonstrates desire. 
The plaintiff must also establish the second component of cau-
sation: that it had a reasonable probability of actual market en-
try. 
Ability to Enter the Relevant Market: In addition to show-
ing a desire to enter the monopolized market, an antitrust 
plaintiff must prove that it had realistic prospects of entering 
the market in a reasonable time.301 If the plaintiff had previ-
ously been in the market and was forced out due to the defen-
dant’s threats, the ability to compete is easily inferred.302 Anti-
 
 300. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pre-
gerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Thus, ‘our circuit, along 
with most circuits, has held that a potential competitor has standing if he can 
show a genuine intent to enter the market and a preparedness to do so.’” 
(quoting Bubar v. Ampco Foods, Inc., 752 F.2d 445, 450 (9th Cir. 1985))). 
 301. What constitutes a reasonable time will be a function of the character-
istics of the particular market. 
 302. In declaratory judgment cases, courts have held that the “plaintiff 
must be engaged in an actual making, selling, or using activity subject to an 
infringement charge or must have made meaningful preparation for such ac-
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trust courts have noted that when plaintiffs claim “that the de-
fendant unlawfully prevented the plaintiff from engaging in a 
business, particularized allegations of preparedness are essen-
tial.”303 Courts consider the following to represent indicia of 
preparedness: “adequate background and experience in the new 
field, sufficient financial capability to enter it, and the taking of 
actual and substantial affirmative steps toward entry, ‘such as 
the consummation of relevant contracts and procurement of 
necessary facilities and equipment.’”304 Also important are 
market studies commissioned by the plaintiff when it was con-
sidering market entry. Such reports often itemize the costs and 
benefits of market entry, and list the barriers to entry and the 
firm’s ability to overcome these barriers in light of its assets. 
When available, market analyses can help the fact-finder 
evaluate whether the plaintiff bore a reasonable chance of suc-
cessfully entering the relevant market given the plaintiff ’s as-
sets—both those assets held and those reasonably capable of 
acquisition. 
In addition to any contemporaneous records evaluating the 
prospects for successful market entry, both sides may introduce 
relevant expert testimony. Of course, there can never be cer-
tainty about whether a particular competitor would have suc-
ceeded. However, this uncertainty can be attributed to the de-
fendant’s anticompetitive conduct—assuming that the plaintiff 
can establish causation, discussed below. By analogy, success-
ful plaintiffs enjoy some latitude in estimating antitrust dam-
ages when precise calculations are not available because the 
defendant’s antitrust violation prevented the plaintiff from 
making sales.305 Here, too, the defendant should not gain a liti-
gation advantage by excluding competitors in a manner that 
requires courts to speculate about whether the plaintiff would 
have succeeded; the defendant’s actions have made speculation 
a necessity. If all of the other elements of the cause of action 
are established, courts should be reluctant to impose too high a 
 
tivity.” Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). If the plaintiff is actually making and selling its product at 
full capacity, then it would be difficult to show any antitrust injury; so, “mean-
ingful preparation” is the important language. 
 303. Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 608, 613 
(N.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 304. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 806–07 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 
1977)). 
 305. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264–65 (1946). 
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burden on plaintiffs seeking to establish that they would have 
been viable competitors if the defendant’s patent had not de-
terred their market entry. This leads to the final component re-
quired to prove the causal antitrust injury element. 
The Defendant’s Invalid Patent Caused the Decision Not to 
Enter the Market: After proving the desire and ability to enter 
the relevant market, the plaintiff must establish that the rea-
son it declined market entry was fear of infringing the defen-
dant’s patent. As with testimony regarding the desire to enter a 
market, the plaintiff ’s decision-makers’ testimony that the firm 
declined market entry because of the defendant’s invalid patent 
is important, but potentially suspect. However, such testimony 
can be corroborated by contemporaneous records documenting 
the plaintiff ’s awareness of the defendant’s patent and the 
plaintiff ’s decision-making process.306 There may be multiple 
reasons why a competitor did not enter a market, but when a 
monopolist knowingly uses an invalid patent to maintain its 
market power, the causation requirement should not be applied 
so strictly as to deny an antitrust remedy to competitors who 
were deterred from entering the market at least in part be-
cause of the presence of that invalid patent. If courts apply too 
stringent a causation requirement in such cases, they could es-
sentially immunize monopoly-enhancing conduct that has no 
socially redeeming value. 
The causation issues will be more nuanced when the mo-
nopolist possesses a patent portfolio. In some situations, a sin-
gle patent may suffice to monopolize a relevant market. While 
this happens more often in the pharmaceutical industry, it can 
happen in other industries as well. But, in many cases, patents 
are part of a larger portfolio, and one invalid patent in a large 
portfolio should not necessarily trigger antitrust liability. The 
issue is whether the invalid patent is critical to maintaining 
the dominant firm’s monopoly power. In other words, would the 
competitor have entered the market if the monopolist had only 
its portfolio of valid patents without the invalid patent as well? 
Patent law makes a distinction between essential patents and 
 
 306. To be most persuasive, such documents should probably indicate that 
the firm did not wish to risk an infringement suit and that the firm’s decision-
makers did not believe that the firm could efficiently enter the market without 
infringing the patent. 
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non-essential patents.307 If the invalid patent is non-essential, 
then it should not serve as the basis for antitrust liability. 
However, if the monopolist holds an essential patent that it 
knows to be invalid, then it is potentially liable if the plaintiff 
can prove the remaining elements under Section Two. 
B. ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION 
In addition to violating the Sherman Act’s prohibition 
against actual monopolization, the knowing maintenance of an 
invalid patent could constitute illegal attempted monopoliza-
tion. The Supreme Court has held that “to demonstrate at-
tempted monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the de-
fendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct 
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power.”308 The first element 
of the Spectrum Sports test is the same as the second element 
of the Grinnell test; thus, the above analysis of intent and the 
duty to disavow applies here as well. However, there are two 
major differences between the Grinnell and Spectrum Sports 
tests.309 First, while the third element of the Spectrum Sports 
attempted monopolization test requires the same process of de-
fining the relevant market as the first element of the Grinnell 
test, it can be satisfied with a lower market share.310 Second, 
the attempted monopolization test requires a greater level of 
intent than that required by a monopolization claim.311 The at-
tempted monopolization plaintiff must show that the defendant 
knew its patent was invalid while holding it out to the world as 
 
 307. See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 
1194 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that “non-essential” patents constitute separate 
products from “essential” patents in a packaging licensing agreement). 
 308. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (citing 3 
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 820, at 312 (1978)). 
 309. See supra notes 284–92 and accompanying text. 
 310. See Multiflex v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 990 (5th Cir. 
1983) (“Attempted monopolization under Section 2 is usually defined as an un-
successful attempt to achieve monopolization.”), abrogated on other grounds by 
Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 311. Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1385 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Indeed, in American Hoist & Derrick, this court, apparently 
applying Ninth Circuit law, stated that in a Walker Process claim of attempt-
ing to monopolize ‘a specific intent, greater than an intent evidenced by gross 
negligence or recklessness, is an indispensable element.’” (quoting Am. Hoist 
& Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1984))). 
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valid, and that the defendant had a specific intent to monopo-
lize a relevant market.312 
Thus, even if the patent-holder does not yet possess full 
monopoly power, so long as its market share is sufficiently high 
to represent a dangerous probability of monopolization, main-
tenance of invalid patent may form the basis of Section Two at-
tempted monopolization liability. 
C. ANTITRUST LAW CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY 
INVALID PATENTS BETTER THAN THE PATENT SYSTEM. 
Ultimately, the antitrust law regime provides a better 
mechanism for deterring and punishing the maintenance of in-
valid patents that injure competition. Invalid patents unneces-
sarily and inefficiently deter competitors from entering the 
market. In its amicus brief in support of the petitioner in 
Walker Process, the government took note of “the public policy 
favoring the elimination of fraudulently obtained patents, 
which otherwise would clog our system of free competition.”313 
The goal of remedying an injury to competition is the province 
of antitrust jurisprudence.314 
The need for an antitrust solution can be seen on several 
levels. First, an expanded antitrust cause of action would prop-
erly incentivize excluded competitors to sue to invalidate bad 
patents. In particular, collective action problems of firms wait-
ing for their rivals to take legal action against a suspect patent 
would be avoided. As discussed above, collective action prob-
lems may dissuade firms from challenging suspect patents be-
cause the individual benefits of victory do not outweigh the 
costs of the challenge.315 Antitrust solves the collective action 
problem by giving sufficient incentives to strike invalid patents. 
Besides being able to practice the invention of the stricken pat-
 
 312. See Darda Inc. USA v. Majorette Toys (U.S.) Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1121, 
1140–41 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev’d in part on other grounds, 824 F.2d 976 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“Antitrust liability based on alleged fraudulent patent procurement 
requires a specific intent to monopolize. An intent evidenced by gross negli-
gence or even recklessness is insufficient to establish antitrust liability, which 
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
 313. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 83, at 6, re-
printed in ANTITRUST BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 730. 
 314. See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 
680, 684 (1944) (“The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within 
the protection of the patent is measured by the anti-trust laws not by the pat-
ent law.”). 
 315. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
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ent, the victorious plaintiff would be entitled to treble damages, 
likely exceeding the costs of challenging an invalid patent. 
Thus, antitrust solves the collective action problem, which is 
itself a barrier to entry. 
While there are other means of overcoming the collective 
action problem,316 antitrust provides the most effective solu-
tion. For example, Professor Thomas proposes a bounty sys-
tem.317 While I am generally supportive of bounties,318 using 
antitrust liability instead of patent bounties provides some 
comparative advantages. There is no need to eliminate all inva-
lid patents because many do not “have commercial value, and 
the effort required to scrutinize those that do not would be 
wasteful.”319 Professor Thomas acknowledges that “a generous 
bounty could promote overinvestment in prior art research.”320 
But independent of the amount of the bounty, a bounty system 
that encourages researching the prior art relevant to worthless 
patents would almost certainly produce waste by encouraging 
investment in invalidating patents that have no distorting ef-
fect on the economy. The primary advantage of Section Two li-
ability over a patent bounty is the focused attention on those 
invalid patents that are actually causing harm, or are most 
likely to cause harm. It tethers damages to the amount of harm 
caused. This means that social resources are more likely to be 
focused in a more cost-effective manner. Furthermore, in con-
trast to patent bounties, an antitrust claim would compensate 
those directly injured by the invalid patent. Patent remedies do 
not provide compensation for the injury inflicted against com-
petition. 
Second, an antitrust remedy would better deter future pat-
ent fraud. Deterrence requires meaningful punishment of the 
bad act. The patent system does not adequately deter fraud 
 
 316. The FTC has suggested that it recognizes the collective action problem 
and may help try to overcome it by becoming involved in challenges to ques-
tionable patents. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 6, at 22. 
 317. Thomas, supra note 7, at 305, 342–43. 
 318. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX L. 
REV. 515, 655 (2004). 
 319. Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 755; Lemley, supra note 5, at 1497 (“[T]he 
overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even licensed. . . . 
[Therefore,] it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determina-
tions in those few cases than to invest additional resources examining patents 
that will never be heard from again.”); cf. Miller, supra note 234, at 675 (“In-
dustry actors have not been sufficiently animated into challenging patents 
that should be brought down.”). 
 320. Thomas, supra note 7, at 345. 
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against the PTO in large part because the punishment is insuf-
ficient. The punishment is generally loss of the patent, which, 
in the invalid patent context, frequently acts as no deterrent at 
all. If the only punishment for bank robbing were to have to 
give the money back when caught, bank robbing would be 
highly rational—and popular. While attorney sanctions may ef-
fectively prevent lawyer participation in fraud upon the PTO, 
such sanctions do nothing to deter patent applicants from con-
cealing disqualifying information from their patent counsel. 
Antitrust imposes a more meaningful punishment on the firm. 
With its treble damages remedy, antitrust law can help deter 
fraud and thus simultaneously achieve important goals with 
both the patent and antitrust regimes. 
Third, by solving the collective action problem and avoiding 
the standing hurdles in declaratory judgment actions, an anti-
trust action results in earlier invalidation of the patent and 
quicker restoration of the competitive market. The legal system 
should encourage expedient invalidation of bad patents.321 
Early invalidation saves resources because competitors do not 
have to invest in researching or inventing around a bad patent. 
Knowing that they could more easily challenge suspect patents, 
competitors would be more likely to consider entering markets 
that would otherwise remain foreclosed. Eliminating the en-
forcement requirement will lead to the invalidation of bad pat-
ents sooner because the patentee would no longer control the 
initiation of litigation. Under the current system, the holder of 
an invalid patent can forestall both antitrust and declaratory 
judgment lawsuits by declining to affirmatively enforce the 
patent. Although the mere presence of the patent in the mar-
ketplace could deter entry, no excluded competitor would have 
standing to sue. Creating an antitrust cause of action based on 
a monopolist’s knowing possession of an invalid patent would 
solve this problem. 
Finally, antitrust law allows the fashioning of appropriate 
individual remedies. The anticompetitive effects of the invalid 
patent may even continue for some time after the (invalid) pat-
 
 321. See Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 702 (“The public interest favors early 
challenge of patents so that the discoveries are available sooner for use free of 
tribute to their inventors.”); see also Nard, supra note 94, at 762 (“In short, 
patent owners, their competitors, and the public are being ill-served by not 
having resolution of proprietary and competitive certainty until so late in the 
‘sterile enterprise of litigation.’” (quoting Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 
87 F.3d 1559, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Bryson, J., concurring))). 
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ent has expired.322 But a patent declaratory judgment action 
merely invalidates the patent; it does not affirmatively level 
the playing field moving forward, which can be particularly im-
portant in markets with high customer loyalty or network ef-
fects.323 By contrast, antitrust law can fix the problem through 
injunctive relief designed to restore competition. For example, 
an antitrust remedy can allow customers locked into long-term 
contracts the opportunity to exit those contracts in favor of 
dealing with another competitor. Alternatively, if there are sig-
nificant switching costs, antitrust courts can find a way to 
make the liable monopolist pay those costs. 
While it would be possible to change the patent system to 
better deal with invalid patents—for example, by increasing re-
sources at the PTO or relaxing the standard for declaratory 
judgment actions—expanded antitrust liability addresses the 
problem of invalid patents better than exclusive reliance on the 
patent system. More time on the front-end of the patent proc-
ess, for example, is unlikely to uncover situations in which a 
patent applicant lies about the absence of patent-disqualifying 
bars, such as early offers to sell. Making standing for declara-
tory judgments of invalidity easier to obtain does not solve the 
collective action problem. Highlighting the downsides of other 
approaches does not mean that such proposals should not be at-
tempted or that my proposal will completely solve the problem 
of invalid patents. It will not. No single approach could elimi-
nate invalid patents from the U.S. marketplace. My proposal is 
no exception; it will not eliminate all invalid patents, and I do 
not claim that it will. But my proposal should lead to greater 
exposure and punishment of some competition-distorting inva-
lid patents (those of the most concern) and provide greater de-
terrence against future fraud on the PTO. Also, my proposal 
could easily be pursued in conjunction with other suggestions 
for better vetting patent applications and eliminating invalid 
patents, such as an expansion of opposition hearings.324 
 
 322. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 25, at 8, reprinted in ANTITRUST BRIEFS 
& ORAL ARGUMENTS, supra note 25, at 666 (“The monopoly effect continued 
even after expiration of the patent because it deprived Walker of acquiring, 
during the term of the fraudulent monopoly, the experience which purchasers 
in this field require of their equipment suppliers.”). 
 323. See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 236–42 and accompanying text (discussing the short-
comings of public use and opposition proceedings). 
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Monopolists do not currently have sufficient incentives to 
disavow patents that they know to be invalid. Given the poten-
tial market-distorting effects of some invalid patents, the law 
should create such incentives. Using antitrust law as the 
mechanism to do so will both create a meaningful incentive 
(given the trebling of damages) and also focus attention on 
those invalid patents that actually result in competitive harm. 
Judicial and social resources would not be spent culling patents 
that may be invalid but inflict no harm. Permitting antitrust 
liability for monopolists who acquire or maintain their monop-
oly power by holding invalid patents would simultaneously 
serve the goals of both antitrust law and patent law. 
V.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR A 
MONOPOLIST’S MAINTENANCE OF INVALID PATENTS   
There are several possible arguments against recognizing 
an antitrust cause of action based on a monopolist’s possession 
of an invalid patent that excludes competitors. First, the letter 
of an expanded rule could be too broad and condemn conduct 
that it should not. Second, new laws create the risk of false 
positives and may unintentionally condemn beneficial conduct. 
As a result, expanded liability can deter useful conduct. Third, 
an expanded Walker Process claim could encourage nuisance 
suits. This Section addresses each of these concerns in turn. 
A. TOO BROAD A CAUSE OF ACTION 
There is much debate and consternation about antitrust 
law encroaching on intellectual property law. Supporters of 
strong patent rights seem to bemoan any efforts to impose anti-
trust liability on patent-holders. The common refrain is that 
the risk of antitrust liability will deter innovation by making 
the acquisition of patents less attractive. In the conflict be-
tween antitrust law and intellectual property, advocates of 
strong patent rights contend that antitrust law should give 
way, lest society lose the advantages achieved by the U.S. pat-
ent system. 
While some commentators argue that antitrust law should 
avoid interfering with patent rights, the condemned conduct 
here—knowing possession of invalid patents—is clearly repre-
hensible. The only acts that a duty to disavow will deter are 
fraud upon the PTO and the knowing maintenance of invalid 
patents by monopolists. These are hardly the types of conduct 
that we should worry about chilling. Where is the slippery 
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slope, the risk of overdeterrence? Finish this sentence: If mo-
nopolists cannot commit fraud on the PTO, then . . . . Then 
what? What is the great calamity that will befall America’s sys-
tem of investment in research and development if people can-
not lie to the Patent Office or otherwise maintain patents that 
they know are invalid?325 
Expanding antitrust liability creates little risk of chilling 
beneficial conduct. The only conduct that will be deterred is 
patentees committing fraud on the PTO or knowingly holding 
on to an invalid patent and representing it to the world as a 
valid patent. Innocent holders of invalid patents would not be 
punished because the antitrust plaintiff would be required to 
prove not merely that the monopoly-maintaining patent was 
invalid, but that the monopolist knew that it was invalid. There 
is no compelling argument for allowing a monopolist to use an 
invalid patent as an entry barrier when the monopolist knows 
that its patent is invalid. Expanded Walker Process liability 
will not discourage firms from acquiring legitimate patents. 
While it may deter them from obtaining or maintaining invalid 
patents, that deterrence is an unmitigated benefit. In short, 
eliminating the enforcement requirement in Walker Process 
claims would not interfere with legitimate patent rights. 
Another potential criticism of eliminating the enforcement 
requirement is that it is tantamount to removing the monopoly 
conduct element altogether from a Section Two claim, essen-
tially converting monopolization into an inchoate violation. In 
those cases in which the patentee has perpetrated fraud 
against the PTO, the commission of fraud is clearly conduct. 
But in no case would antitrust law punish the monopolist’s 
mere thought or intent; it should punish the knowing posses-
sion of an invalid patent. Possession of an object—whether it is 
 
 325. Some may opt out of the patent system and resort to trade secret pro-
tection. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental 
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 105–18 (2004). But if a pat-
ent should not issue, this is precisely the course of action that should happen. 
The larger concern may be that a firm considering whether to patent its 
invention—and believing its invention to be patentable—may worry that it 
will later discover the patent is invalid and it will be left without any intellec-
tual property protection, either patent or trade secret. Risk averse companies 
may opt for trade secret protection instead of applying for a patent, thereby 
preventing public disclosure of the invention. But all firms must currently 
worry that their patents may be invalidated after issuance. This is part of the 
current calculus. When firms knowingly receive patents that should not have 
issued, they should not be able to profit from the exclusionary effects of such 
invalid patents. 
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intellectual property, like a patent, or physical property, like 
drugs or counterfeit goods—is conduct.326 More importantly, 
antitrust law already provides a relatively low threshold for the 
type of conduct sufficient to satisfy Grinnell’s second prong, es-
pecially in the refusal-to-deal context.327 The refusal of a mo-
nopolist to disavow a patent that it knows to be invalid is as 
much conduct as a monopolist’s refusal to share access to an es-
sential facility. What matters is the anticompetitive effect of 
the monopolist’s conduct, not the amount of energy exerted. 
Finally, eliminating the enforcement requirement does not 
undermine patent policy. As the Supreme Court recognized in 
Walker Process, a rule “that private suits may be instituted un-
der § 4 of the Clayton Act to recover damages for Sherman Act 
monopolization knowingly practiced under the guise of a patent 
procured by deliberate fraud, cannot well be thought to impinge 
upon the policy of the patent laws to encourage inventions and 
their disclosure.”328 By providing a meaningful penalty for 
maintaining invalid patents, expanded antitrust liability could 
deter fraud against the PTO and make the patent system more 
efficient. 
B. RISK OF FALSE POSITIVES 
Courts and commentators are generally reluctant to ex-
pand Section Two liability out of fear of deterring pro-
competitive conduct. No efficiency arguments could possibly 
justify the knowing maintenance of invalid patents, especially 
when a dominant firm is using those patents to secure its mo-
nopoly power. Nevertheless, there is a risk that the expansion 
of antitrust law could have negative effects on the patent sys-
tem.329 
 
 326. See United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that possession of a sawed-off shotgun constitutes conduct under the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 35 (1st Cir. 1983) (de-
scribing possession of preparation lists, clean-up lists, and payroll lists relat-
ing to a drug deal as conduct under the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 327. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
600–05 (1985); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154–55 
(1951). 
 328. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 
172, 179–80 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 329. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 1, at 13 (“Patents thus 
present an additional concern to antitrust enforcers: mistaken antitrust en-
forcement may undermine the incentives the patent system creates.”). 
LESLIE_5FMT 12/1/2006 8:54:00 AM 
178 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:101 
 
While false positives are possible, antitrust law is equipped 
to handle them. First, false positives could result if a patentee 
is found liable for violating Section Two when the fact-finder 
incorrectly concludes that the monopolist’s patent is invalid. 
This result seems unlikely given the difficulty of proving that a 
patent is invalid.330 There is no evidence of this type of false 
positive occurring in current challenges to patent validity. 
Second, a false positive would result if the fact-finder cor-
rectly concludes a monopolist’s patent is invalid but incorrectly 
concludes that the monopolist knew of the patent’s invalidity. 
This precise possibility currently exists for Walker Process 
claims, which require the plaintiff to establish a monopolist’s 
knowledge of patent invalidity.331 Yet there is no evidence that 
juries mistakenly find such knowledge when none in fact ex-
ists.332 
Third, a fact-finder may correctly conclude that a defen-
dant knowingly maintained an invalid patent, but may incor-
rectly conclude that the defendant had monopoly power. This 
mistake is possible in all Section Two litigation. District courts 
and appellate courts have repeatedly shown themselves more 
than willing to reject jury verdicts for antitrust plaintiffs on 
this score. Also, while an incorrect finding of monopoly power 
would be a false positive, false positives are generally con-
demned because beneficial conduct is deterred.333 What effi-
cient conduct is improperly condemned or deterred here? Any 
firm’s knowing possession of an invalid patent is hardly to be 
encouraged. Furthermore, the defendant has complete control 
over this form of false positive: it may disavow patents known 
to be invalid, thereby avoiding false positives. The fact that 
non-monopolists, too, might have an incentive to disavow their 
invalid patents is not necessarily a bad outcome. 
 
 330. See supra notes 5–20 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty of 
proving patents invalid). 
 331. Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177 (noting that a plaintiff ’s proof of 
knowing misrepresentation would be sufficient to strip antitrust protection, 
while a defendant’s good faith would serve as a complete defense to such an 
action). 
 332. While there is much criticism of antitrust law examining intent be-
cause there is a risk that juries will punish mere anticompetitive desires, that 
is not the type of intent discussed here. We are not examining the monopolist’s 
motives, but its knowledge. This element provides additional protection for 
patentees. 
 333. For example, a false positive in a predatory pricing setting could dis-
courage efficient firms from charging lower legal prices. Matsushita Elec. In-
dus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986). 
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In sum, while each of these versions of a false positive is 
possible, antitrust law is equipped to screen them out. Every 
element—monopoly power, patent invalidity, intent, and causa-
tion—acts as a filter against false positives, since a plaintiff ’s 
failure to prove any of those elements dooms its claim. 
The risks of false positives can be reduced further through 
heightened pleading requirements. For example, courts could 
require the antitrust plaintiff to plead with particularity why 
the patent is invalid in order to survive a motion to dismiss or 
for summary judgment. An antitrust plaintiff should be re-
quired to cite with specificity the actual prior art or direct evi-
dence of a first sale invalidation that allegedly renders the de-
fendant’s patent invalid. 
Finally, a focus on the risk of false positives should not 
blind us to the risks and costs of false negatives. Yet there is a 
serious risk of false negatives, of monopolists excluding com-
petitors through the possession of invalid patents. Many pat-
ents are, in fact, invalid.334 At this point we cannot know the 
full scope of the problem or how many invalid patents will be 
exposed through expanded antitrust liability. The current legal 
rules help conceal the number of invalid patents because ex-
cluded competitors face a high bar in establishing standing to 
challenge suspect patents. Sly monopolists may hold onto their 
patents without actively enforcing them, benefiting from the 
exclusionary effects of the patent system without exposing 
themselves either to declaratory judgment actions or to anti-
trust lawsuits. These are false negatives. The social costs of 
such false negatives include decreased production, higher 
prices, deadweight loss, and reduced innovation. The law 
should be as concerned with these false negatives as it is with 
false positives. 
C. NUISANCE SUITS 
Recognizing any new cause of action creates a risk of nui-
sance suits. Some may argue that unscrupulous lawyers will 
file antitrust suits as a matter of course upon learning of in-
validated patents.335 The fear is not unfounded. History teaches 
 
 334. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text (noting the relatively high 
incidence of patent invalidity). 
 335. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 22 (“The record 
reveals substantial concerns that post-grant review proceedings could become 
very time consuming and might be used as vehicles for harassing patentees.”). 
It could also be argued that without the enforcement requirement, merely 
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that some plaintiffs’ counsel seek out areas of the law in which 
to bring a high volume of arguably meritless lawsuits, usually 
with the sole intent of coercing quick settlements—in other 
words, pestering defendants until paid to go away. Before Con-
gress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(PSLRA),336 class action attorneys routinely filed securities 
fraud suits of dubious merit. There was a perception that 
whenever a company’s stock value declined, unethical lawyers 
would automatically file securities fraud suits. Some might 
worry that a similar phenomenon could play out in antitrust 
litigation, where the invalidation of a patent would automati-
cally invite a Section Two lawsuit. 
There is reason to believe that the abuses witnessed in pre-
PSLRA securities fraud litigation would not visit themselves 
upon a new antitrust cause of action based on knowing mainte-
nance of an invalid patent. The securities fraud suits were class 
actions, in which counsel used repeat players as the class rep-
resentatives. However, Walker Process litigation does not lend 
itself to class action litigation because consumers generally do 
not have standing to sue. The pool of potential plaintiffs—
excluded competitors in a particular market—is sufficiently 
small that it would generally not satisfy the numerosity re-
quirement for federal class action litigation.337 Attorneys would 
have to represent actual companies that can plead and prove 
that they were ready, willing, and able to enter the market but 
declined to do so because of the defendant’s patent. 
The same elements that protect against false positives 
should screen out frivolous suits.338 The plaintiff must prove 
the relevant product market and relevant geographic market, 
and must convince the judge that the defendant possessed mo-
nopoly power in that properly defined market, that the defen-
dant secured monopoly through the exclusionary effects of a 
 
acquiring a patent could draw a nuisance antitrust suit. However, people 
could bring frivolous suits falsely asserting enforcement now, just as they may 
falsely assert that the patentee has monopoly power and its patent is invalid. 
Eliminating the enforcement requirement does not change the frivolity of the 
suit. 
 336. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 337. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (requiring a class to be “so numerous that 
joinder of all members would be impracticable”). 
 338. See supra notes 328–33 and accompanying text (describing the screen-
ing effect of the requirement that a Section Two plaintiff prove monopoly 
power, patent invalidity, intent, and causation). 
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patent it knew to be invalid, and that the plaintiff was ready, 
willing, and able to proceed to enter the market but was de-
terred by the presence of the defendant’s patent (which later 
turned out to be invalid). District court judges can operate as 
gate keepers at summary judgment. Especially following Mat-
sushita,339 district court judges are more inclined to grant 
summary judgment to defendants in antitrust cases. 
While concerns that a rival might bring antitrust litigation 
to harass a dominant firm are rational, it is important to re-
member that competitors can bring nuisance suits now, under 
either antitrust or patent law. The same risk exists whenever a 
patentee attempts to enforce its patent. Just as declaratory 
judgment actions and antitrust suits are currently routinely 
dismissed at a relatively early stage of proceedings, so could 
any nuisance suit brought under an expanded Walker Process 
doctrine. If competitors abuse this new cause of action, judges 
should be willing to impose Rule 11 sanctions against any com-
petitor who brings a frivolous suit. The fear of nuisance suits 
alone should not prevent the creation of a legal remedy against 
those who abuse the patent system in order to secure illegal 
monopolies. The answer is to punish nuisance suits, not to pro-
tect illegal monopolies. 
Furthermore, courts can screen out frivolous suits through 
heightened pleading requirements. To the extent that Walker 
Process claims began as a species of fraud claims—based on 
fraudulent procurement of a patent—it is not unreasonable to 
apply the requirement of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that fraud must be pled with specificity.340 Although 
knowingly maintaining an invalid patent is not technically a 
form of fraud subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading re-
quirement, a move in this direction would represent a minor 
change.341 
 
 339.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–
87 (1986) (increasing the evidentiary burden on antitrust plaintiffs to survive 
summary judgment). 
 340. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”). 
 341. Charges of inequitable conduct—essentially fraud on the PTO—
already require heightened pleading. See Simpson v. Stand 21 S.A., 32 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1848, 1850 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (“Under Rule 9(b), the defendants 
must specifically plead the time, place, and content of any alleged misrepre-
sentations the plaintiffs made to the PTO, and the requisite intent.”); Chiron 
Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219, 221 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“[P]ublic policy 
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Fear of private plaintiffs run amok might lead us to con-
sider whether reliance on federal antitrust authorities is the 
appropriate way to attack invalid patents. If the enforcement 
requirement of Walker Process were eliminated, then lawyers 
at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Jus-
tice Antitrust Division would be able to bring antitrust claims 
against monopolists who maintained their monopoly power 
through mere possession of invalid patents. By way of remedy, 
a successful government plaintiff could request damages based 
on the monopoly profits earned by the defendant—either com-
plete disgorgement, twice the gain, or treble damages—and 
could suggest appropriate injunctive relief. These remedies 
could disgorge ill-gotten gains, provide a meaningful deterrent, 
and help restore a competitive market. Government-sponsored 
litigation would be good, but so long as private lawsuits were 
available, it would not solve the problem of potential nuisance 
suits. Unfortunately, government enforcement alone would 
probably not be a sufficient deterrent, since federal antitrust 
authorities have finite resources and bring only a fraction of 
antitrust suits, especially under Section Two of the Sherman 
Act.342 Antitrust law does not put exclusive reliance on gov-
ernment actors—save for criminal prosecutions—because gov-
ernment alone cannot discover, litigate, and remedy all anti-
trust violations. The rational approach is to undertake an 
antitrust experiment. The courts or Congress should recognize 
a private antitrust cause of action for a monopolist’s knowing 
maintenance of an invalid patent. If the cause of action leads to 
abuse in the hands of private plaintiffs, then leaving the task 
solely to government enforcers would be appropriate. 
Finally, the fear of lawsuits is not a sufficient reason to 
deny an antitrust remedy. Responding to this same argument 
in Walker Process, the Supreme Court opined: “Nor can the in-
terest in protecting patentees from ‘innumerable vexatious 
suits’ be used to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by 
the antitrust laws. It must be remembered that we deal only 
with a special class of patents, i.e., those procured by inten-
 
considerations dictate that the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct be 
subject to Rule 9(b).”). 
 342. Although the government brings relatively little Section Two litiga-
tion, this is one area of illegal monopolization with which even those who dis-
favor antitrust prosecutions generally should have no serious trouble. There is 
no efficiency argument to support monopolization through the maintenance of 
invalid patents. 
LESLIE_5FMT 12/1/2006 8:54:00 AM 
2006] UNENFORCED INVALID PATENTS 183 
 
tional fraud.”343 The Court’s analysis applies equally when one 
considers the anticompetitive effects of unenforced patents that 
the monopolist knows to be invalid. 
  CONCLUSION   
Patents are by their nature exclusionary. Patent rights are 
quintessential barriers to entry. Particularly strong patents 
can effectively block all entry into a particular market. Even if 
a patent does not block market entry completely, it can force 
competitors to invent around the patent in an effort to create a 
noninfringing competing product. This also represents a barrier 
to entry, as the process of inventing around requires an in-
vestment of time and money, and may not result in an equally 
desirable product. These social costs are tolerable when the 
patent represents a meaningful advancement of the state of the 
art. But when the patent is invalid, yet still has anticompeti-
tive effects, the law should provide a remedy for excluded com-
petitors. 
Currently, neither patent law nor antitrust law is up to the 
task of deterring and punishing monopolists who maintain 
their market power through the possession of invalid patents. 
Courts have imposed an enforcement requirement on antitrust 
plaintiffs based on the assumption that invalid patents injure 
competition only when the holder affirmatively enforces the in-
valid patent against infringers through threats or litigation. 
Unfortunately, maintaining an invalid patent is currently a 
cost-effective way for a monopolist to exclude competitors even 
without threats or litigation. The patentee can charge a mo-
nopoly price without risking antitrust liability: there is little 
likelihood of exposure because litigation is perhaps the best 
way to expose invalid patents and, under the current legal 
rules, patentees can prevent litigation by not actively enforcing 
their patents. Eliminating the enforcement requirement for 
Walker Process claims would create necessary incentives for 
monopolists to disavow those of their patents which they know 
to be invalid. This approach could eliminate the competition-
distorting effects that flow from monopolists’ mere possession of 
invalid patents. 
 
 343. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 
172, 176 (1965) (quoting Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871)). 
